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ABSTRACT 
The central bank of Zambia called Bank of Zambia (BOZ) has, like many other central banks in 
both developing and developed economies, been from time to time intervening in the foreign 
exchange market by either purchasing or selling foreign exchange (mainly United States of 
America Dollars) to the market. Central banks have given a myriad of reasons for this particular 
behaviour. Chief among these and which is the focus of this paper is to smooth volatility or 
reverse a trend of the domestic currency in this case the kwacha. Despite central banks‟ 
intervention activities in the foreign exchange markets, literature on the efficacy of these 
interventions in terms of impacting domestic currencies has remained controversial. While some 
strands of literature seem to suggest that such intervention has an impact on the currencies 
some literature disagrees.  
 
Early studies done in the 1980s suggest that intervention operations do not affect the exchange 
rate and if they do this effect is very small and only in the short run. More recent studies 
however, have found evidence of the effect on both the level and volatility of exchange rates. 
Further, recent studies focused on emerging market and developing countries have found strong 
evidence of the effect of central banks‟ intervention operations in the foreign exchange market 
on exchange rates.   
 
This paper therefore examines the effect of the BOZ‟s foreign currency market interventions on 
the level and volatility of the kwacha/ USD exchange rate between 1995 and 2008. In order to 
study the impact of interventions on the kwacha, the paper uses monthly data (both sales and 
purchases) on foreign exchange intervention and employs the GARCH (1, 1) and Exponential 
GARCH frameworks to model volatility. The results from GARCH model suggest that sales of 
foreign exchange in this case the $ causes the exchange rate to appreciate while purchases of 
the $ cause the exchange rate to depreciate. As for the impact on volatility, the GARCH (1, 1) 
model reveals that BOZ interventions increase volatility.  
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 Empirical results from the EGARCH model on the other hand suggest that both sales and 
purchases of $ cause the exchange rate to appreciate. The results on the impact of intervention 
on volatility are mixed though generally intervention appears to be increasing volatility.  
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1   INTRODUCTION 
Foreign exchange intervention is the process by which central banks and other monetary 
authorities either buy or sell foreign exchange in the foreign exchange market normally 
against their own currencies in line with some policy objective.  Some of the objectives 
include among others to control inflation or maintain internal balance; to maintain external 
balance and prevent resource misallocation or preserve competitiveness and boost growth; 
and to prevent or deal with disorderly markets or crises. To achieve these objectives, central 
banks might seek to target the level of the exchange rate, dampen exchange rate volatility 
or influence the amount of foreign reserves.   
 
There are a number of reasons why central banks intervene in the foreign exchange markets. 
There are however, four common reasons; to calm disorderly markets (smoothing volatility), 
cure exchange rate misalignment, signal future monetary policy and build international 
reserves. 
 
Exchange rates like many other financial assets exhibit volatility trends which may result in 
loss of liquidity. This volatility may also have adverse effects on international trade, the 
external balance and threaten the orderly functioning of the market. Central banks may 
therefore intervene to calm this disorderly behaviour. 
 
There are times that exchange rates drift away from fundamentals and what monetary 
authorities consider to be the equilibrium level. Therefore, central banks may be forced to 
try and reverse this misalignment and bring the exchange rate back to its normal path. 
 
Moreno (2005) reporting on a survey of why central banks in emerging market economies  
intervened  revealed that policymakers are typically concerned not just with how much the 
exchange rate might deviate from  equilibrium but with how quickly it does so. Intervention 
will often attempt to slow the rate of change in the exchange rate without preventing trend 
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changes, a policy that is known as „leaning against the wind”. While intervention of this kind 
typically occurs when the exchange rate is moving away from equilibrium, it can sometimes 
occur if the exchange rate is moving back to equilibrium, but “too quickly”. Slowing the rate 
of change in the exchange rate can stop herding behaviour by acting as a circuit breaker. By 
reducing uncertainty, this type of intervention may facilitate foreign exchange market 
development. On the other hand, by acting as a provider of “insurance” against rapid 
exchange rate movements, official intervention could also undermine incentives for the 
development of hedging capability in the private sector. Chile, Israel and Mexico were given 
as examples. 
 
Intervention may also be used to signal future changes to monetary policy and calm 
expectations if monetary policy is changed unexpectedly which might otherwise lead to a 
loss in confidence and thereby induce an unwarranted moves in the exchange rate. 
 
Finally, central banks may want to build international reserves of foreign currencies and so 
they will enter the foreign exchange market to purchase a foreign currency. International 
reserves are sometimes used as collateral to attract foreign investors. 
 
The practice of intervention has been around for a while though it really intensified after the 
collapse of the Bretton Woods System in 1972. Before then intervention was allowed for the 
sake of keeping exchanges rates within agreed parity bands. However, after the demise of 
the fixed exchange rate system, the discretion to intervene in the foreign exchange market 
became incumbent upon individual states and their monetary authorities. To this extent the 
International Monetary Fund (IMF) even issued guidelines on how member states should 
conduct their intervention activities. Historically, the G -5 countries who included Japan, 
Germany, the United States of America, and France signed the Plaza Agreement in 1995. The 
agreement was about coordinated intervention. Consequently, over the years all major 
developed countries have intervened in the foreign exchange market on a number of 
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occasions albeit the frequency now is very minimal. However, developing countries are now 
more active in this area.  
Canales-Krijenko (2003) in a survey of central banks‟ foreign exchange market intervention 
revealed that central banks issuing major currencies were seldom active in the foreign 
exchange market because they had developed policy frameworks that target short-term 
interest rates and exchange rate policies that limited foreign exchange intervention to calm 
disorderly market conditions. On the other hand most central banks in developing and 
transitional economies were more active in the foreign exchange market across all exchange 
rate regimes.  
 
However, the key question in academia, politics and government is whether this intervention 
is really effective. Unfortunately, this question and the debate around it has been raging 
from the time of the introduction of the floating exchange system in the early 1970s, and it 
does not seem to be receding. There are three different views points on this matter.  
 
One strand of thought posits that intervention operations do not at all affect the level or 
volatility of the exchange. Another school of thought states that intervention while not being 
only ineffectual at influencing the level of the exchange rate also increases the volatility of 
the exchange. The last strand of thought states that intervention operations do influence the 
exchange rate and do also calm disorderly markets in the process arresting volatility 
(Dominguez 1998, Edison et al 2003) 
 
Empirical studies conducted in the early 1980s have suggested that intervention whether 
sterilized or not was ineffective in as far as affecting the exchange rate was concerned. Of 
particular note was the Jurgensen Report of 1983 which categorically stated that 
intervention was in the main ineffective. However, studies into the phenomenon   conducted 
after the 1990s using high –frequency central bank intervention data which was missing in the 
1980s studies suggest that intervention does have an effect after all.  It should also be noted 
that despite the scepticism about the efficacy of intervention both in academia and public 
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policy sectors, it is ironical that most central banks both in developing and developed 
countries continue to intervene in their foreign exchange markets. This should therefore 
point to the fact that central banks believe intervention does work and is effective in 
achieving their policy objectives. 
 
Broadly speaking an exchange rate is the price of one currency in relation to another.  This 
price is either expressed in domestic currency units per unit of foreign currency or as foreign 
currency units per unit of the domestic currency (Pilbeam 2006). In this paper the former 
definition is adopted such that we express the exchange rate as kwacha units per United 
States of America dollar unit.  When we talk about exchange rates we are invariably talking 
referring to the nominal exchange rate. The definition of nominal exchange rate is alluded to 
earlier. In contrast, a real exchange rate is the price of domestic goods to relative to foreign 
goods or the number of foreign goods one gets in exchange for domestic goods.  
 
The foreign exchange market is where currency trading takes place. It is where institutions 
facilitate the buying and selling of foreign currencies. It involves a process where one party 
purchases a quantity of one currency in exchange for paying a quantity of another. Currently, 
foreign exchange markets are the most liquid financial markets in the world. 
The BIS (2007) reported that turnover in the traditional foreign exchange markets had grown 
unprecedented by 69 per cent since April 200 4 to $3.2 trillion (See graph below).  
 
The U.S. dollar which is the international reserve currency continues, as Table 1 depicts, to 
be the most traded currency world over.   
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Figure 1:   Foreign exchange Turnover (USD millions)  
 
             TABLE 1: MOST TRADED CURRENCIES (2007) 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
       Source: BIS 
 
Rank Currency 
ISO 4217 code 
(Symbol) 
 % daily share 
(April 2007) 
1  United States dollar USD ($) 86.3% 
2  Euro EUR (€) 37.0% 
3  Japanese yen JPY (¥) 17.0% 
4  Pound sterling GBP (£) 15.0% 
5  Swiss franc CHF (Fr) 6.8% 
6  Australian dollar AUD ($) 6.7% 
7  Canadian dollar CAD ($) 4.2% 
8-9  Swedish krona SEK (kr) 2.8% 
8-9  Hong Kong dollar HKD ($) 2.8% 
10  Norwegian krone NOK (kr) 2.2% 
11  New Zealand dollar NZD ($) 1.9% 
12  Mexican peso MXN ($) 1.3% 
13  Singapore dollar SGD ($) 1.2% 
14  South Korean won KRW (₩) 1.1% 
Other 14.5% 
Total 200% 
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There are a number of participants in the foreign exchange market who include the following: 
  
The central banks or monetary authorities. These play an important role in the foreign 
exchange market. They attempt to control the money supply, inflation and or interest rates 
and often have official or unofficial target rates for their currencies. They frequently 
intervene to buy and sell their currencies in a bid to influence the rate at which their 
currency is traded. 
 
Commercial banks. The interbank market caters for both the majority of commercial 
turnover and large amounts of speculative trading.  Some trading is undertaken on behalf of 
customers but much is conducted by proprietary desks trading for the bank‟s own account. 
 
 Commercial companies. They include international investors, multinational corporations 
who need foreign exchange for the purposes of running their businesses.  Normally, they do 
not directly purchase or sell foreign exchange themselves but they place buy/sell orders with 
commercial banks. Though their impact on exchange rates is minimal, commercial companies‟ 
trade flows are an important factor in the long term direction of a currency‟s exchange rate. 
Some firms can have an unpredictable impact when very large positions are covered due to 
exposures that are not widely known by other market participants. 
 
Foreign exchange brokers.  Often banks do not trade directly with one another, but they 
transact through foreign exchange brokers.  
 
Money transfer/ Remittance companies.  These perform high volume low value transfers 
generally by economic migrants to their home country. One example of such institutions is 
Western Union. 
 
Hedge funds act as speculators.  A majority of foreign exchange transactions are 
speculative. Economic agents that buy and sell foreign exchange have no plan to actually 
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take delivery of the currency in the end rather they were solely speculating on the 
movement of that particular currency. They may control billions of equity and may borrow 
billions more and thus overwhelm intervention by central banks to support almost any 
currency if the economic fundamentals are in the hedge funds favour. 
 
 
Foreign exchange markets in emerging markets and developing economies like Zambia are 
fundamentally different from those of developed countries. They are small in size, 
undercapitalized and underdeveloped, sometimes highly regulated by the central banks and 
other monetary authorities. 
 
Disyatatat and Galati (2005) describe the situation in emerging market economies  as 
follows: (i) the size of intervention relative to market turnover tends to be larger, (ii) the 
existence of some form of capital controls limiting access to international capital markets 
gives central banks in these countries greater leverage in the market, and (iii) the lower 
level of sophistication of the domestic market along with stringent reporting requirements 
may endow central banks with a greater informational advantage not only with respect to 
fundamentals but also aggregate order flows and net open positions of major traders. 
 
The size of foreign exchange intervention relative to the turnover in the foreign exchange 
market has a telling effect on the impact of intervention on the exchange rate. Foreign 
exchange intervention in developing countries accounts for a much larger proportion of total 
foreign exchange market turnover than in developed countries. 
Through the existence of foreign exchange controls, like surrender requirements to the 
central banks, some developing countries increase the size of intervention in comparison to 
the size of the foreign exchange market. 
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Central banks in developing countries also possess an information advantage over economic  
agents which their counterpart institutions in developed economies do not possess. For 
example some of them might have a better grasp of aggregate foreign exchange order flow 
including future monetary and exchange rate policy than economic agents. 
 
When examining the efficacy of intervention therefore this clear distinction on the 
environments in emerging market economies as opposed to developed ones is very essential.  
The factors highlighted above seem to make central bank intervention in developing and 
transitional economies more effective than in developed ones. 
This is supported by a number of studies (Edison et al 2003) (Disyatat and Galati 2005) 
(Simatele 2004) (Domac and Mendoza 2004) (Kim et al 2000). 
 
This paper studies the impact of the central of Bank, the Bank of Zambia‟s (BOZ) 
intervention in the foreign exchange market in Zambia on the domestic currency, the kwacha 
(K). It does not distinguish between sterilized or unsterilised intervention due to the limited 
time span of the research. Therefore, it focuses on the fact the BoZ intervened in the foreign 
exchange market. The BOZ has been intervening in the foreign exchange market ever since 
the start of the flexible exchange rate system in 1992. However, due to data unavailability 
the period 1992 -1994 has been excluded from the sample period. 
  
2)     Aims and Objectives 
This paper intends to establish whether the Bank of Zambia‟s intervention in the foreign   
exchange market from 1998 to 2008 has had an impact on the level and volatility of the 
kwacha.  
 
3)  Outline of the Study 
The study is divided into a further five chapters.  Chapter two provides the review of both 
theoretical and empirical literature.  It outlines the assumptions, predictions, and weaknesses 
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of various exchange rate determination models and channels through which central bank 
intervention in the foreign exchange market affects exchange rates.  Chapter three provides a 
brief overview of Zambia and the exchange rate policy history in the country from 
independence to date.   Chapter four describes the data used in the study namely sales and 
purchases of the United States Dollars (USD). It also highlights the EGARCH and GARCH models 
used to model the impact of Bank of Zambia‟s intervention impact on the kwacha.  Chapter 
five provides the empirical results while chapter six is the conclusion. 
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 CHAPTER 2      REVIEW OF LITERATURE 
2. 1.  THEORETICAL LITERATURE. 
 Exchange rate determination is often interpreted to arise from three basic models. These are 
the purchasing power parity, monetary and portfolio balance models. Additionally in the recent 
past the signalling/expectations and microstructure/order flow have been identified as channels 
through which foreign exchange market intervention may affect the exchange rate. These five 
theories are discussed below: 
 
2.1.1. PURCHASING POWER PARITY (PPP) MODEL 
This is the oldest and widely used model for assessing long run exchange rate movements. It 
states that changes in exchange rates between currencies will tend to reflect changes in relative 
countries‟ price levels. 
 
 Its basic tenet according to Pilbeam (2006) is the law of one price which posits that  once prices 
are converted into one currency, the same good should sell for the same price in a another 
country. 
ASSUMPTIONS 
The model assumes the following: 
 The goods are tradable. 
 The goods are homogenous. 
 There are no impediments to trade such as tariffs, transport and transaction costs. 
 The price systems works.  
 The economies are operating at full employment. 
 There is full information across economies. 
 
There are two versions of the model. The absolute PPP is based on the strict interpretation of 
the law of one price while the relative one is a more relaxed and weaker version. 
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The absolute version postulates that the equilibrium exchange rate between two countries‟ 
currencies is determined entirely by the ratio of the two countries‟ national price levels as 
follows: 
 
 S= P ........................................................ 2.0 
    P* 
 
Where S is the domestic exchange rate, P and P* represent domestic and foreign consumer price 
indices respectively. 
Equation 2 states that if the foreign prices go up relative to domestic ones, then the domestic 
currency will appreciate in value. Conversely, if the prices of domestic goods increase relative 
to the foreign ones, then the domestic currency will depreciate. 
The relative version overcomes some hurdles of its predecessor by recognizing the presence of 
transport costs and tariffs in international trade. It posits that the exchange rate will be 
determined by inflation differential between two countries. 
%ΔS =%ΔP - %ΔP*....................................... 2.1. 
 
Where %ΔS is the percentage change in the exchange rate,  
%ΔP in the domestic inflation and  
%ΔP* change in the foreign inflation. 
The relative PPP version predicts that if relative prices double in the home country between a 
base period and some subsequent date, the exchange rate will depreciate by an equal 
proportion. 
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WEAKNESSES 
The model has performed badly in determining exchange rates especially after the introduction 
of flexible exchange rate regimes due to a number of flaws. Firstly, it is difficult to tell whether 
or not the model applies to both tradable and non-tradable sectors. If there is a difference 
between price inflation in the traded and non-traded sectors across countries then the model 
will not capture these effects. Secondly, countries have different weights attached to a similar 
set of goods and services. This will therefore lead to greater disparity from aggregate PPP. 
Further, assumptions related to international movement of goods are not realist because in 
reality transaction and transport costs will always exist when goods move from one country to 
the other. Finally empirically the model has performed very badly. 
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2.1 2.MONETARY MODELS 
The monetary models posit that the exchange rate should be viewed as an asset price which 
depends on the current and expected future values of relative supply of domestic and foreign 
financial assets. They seek to explain how changes in the domestic and foreign supply and 
demand for money both directly and indirectly influence the exchange rate. 
 
The paper examines the Flexible –Price and Sticky- Price monetary models. 
    
FLEXIBLE –PRICE MODEL 
The Flexible-price Monetary Model is attributed to Frenkel (1976) Mussa (1976) and Bilson (1978). 
Though being a monetary (asset) model it is an extension of the PPP model. 
Hallwood and MacDonald (2008) state that the model depends on PPP equation in order to 
explain the exchange rate. 
 
 ASSUMPTIONS 
 Domestic and foreign bonds are perfect substitutes and therefore the Uncovered Interest 
Parity (UIP) condition holds continuously(S=P-P*)  
 Prices and wages are all flexible both downwards and upwards. 
 There is perfect capital mobility. 
 Absolute PPP holds continuously. 
 Demand to hold real money balances is positively related to real income and negatively 
related to the domestic interest rate. 
 Money supply and real income are exogenously determined. 
 The money market is the only important asset market. 
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From the above assumptions, we can derive the main equation (reduced form) of the model 
which is: 
  S= (M- M*) – k(y- y*) +θ(r- r*)............................... (2.2) 
s   = nominal spot exchange rate (domestic currency price of foreign currency) 
m = domestic money supply 
y   = domestic scale variable (usually income level) 
r    = opportunity cost of holding money usually interest rate, 
θ   =   constant 
(Corresponding foreign magnitudes are denoted by an asterisk) 
PREDICTIONS  
The predictions of the flexible-price monetary model are as follows:- 
Firstly there is proportionality between relative monies and the exchange rate so that the 
coefficient on the money supply m is expected to be 1.  In other words, an increase in domestic 
money supply relative to foreign stock would lead to a rise in the exchange rate i.e. 
depreciation of the domestic currency in terms of the foreign currency.  
 
A rise in domestic real income, ceteris paribus, creates an excess demand for domestic money 
stock.  In an attempt to increase their real money balance, domestic residents reduce 
expenditure and prices fall until money market equilibrium is achieved.  Through PPP, falling 
domestic prices (with foreign prices constant) imply an appreciation of the domestic currency in 
terms of the foreign currency. (Sarno and Taylor 2008) 
 Finally, an increase in domestic interest rates leads to a depreciation of domestic currency.  
 
WEAKNESSES 
The major weakness of the model is its reliance on the PPP model and its assumptions are also 
oversimplified. 
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THE STICKY-PRICE MODEL 
The Dornbusch Sticky-Price Model has the same features as the Flexible –Price model in the long 
run but differs in the short run. In this horizon it is assumed that prices and wages are not 
adjustable downwards because they are „sticky‟. This means that the goods market does not 
continuously clear in the short-run and that the PPP condition does not hold but it does so in the 
long-run. 
 
ASSUMPTIONS  
 Goods prices and wages tend to change slowly downward in the short run. 
 Uncovered interest parity (UIP) holds continuously. 
 There are jump variables in exchange rates which compensate for stickiness of goods prices. 
 There is money-neutrality. 
 
SHORT RUN OVERSHOOTING 
Due to price stickiness goods prices do not continuously clear. So there is an asymmetry of 
adjustment between goods and assets markets. The Sticky –Price Pilbeam (2006) 
model is given below  
 
Es
 = Θ (Ŝ – S)                     Θ > 0.                      (2.3) 
 
Where Ŝ is the exchange rate‟s long run value while S is the spot rate and Θ is the adjustment 
parameter and the gap between the current exchange rate S and its long-run equilibrium value Ŝ. 
 
There is “overshooting” of the exchange in the short –run when there is an unexpected increase 
in domestic money supply, the exchange rate and prices level are expected to change 
appropriately. However, due to price stickiness this does not happen. This does not hence clear 
the money market but instead it is cleared by a fall in interest rate.   
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As a result international investors anticipate a depreciation of the currency to compensate for 
the lower interest rates. The domestic currency then appreciates to a level which exceeds 
(overshoots) its long-run value. This follows from the UIP which implies that the domestic 
interest rate can only be below the foreign rate if economic agents expect the exchange rate to 
appreciate which can only happen if the current spot rate moves more than the long run value. 
In essence the extent of the overshooting incidences hinges on the interest rate semi-elasticity 
of the demand for money. 
 
LONG RUN EQUILIBRIUM 
In the long run the PPP equation (S= P-P*) holds.  After the currency overshoots its long run value 
in the short run, it will eventually start depreciating as prices adjust until its long run PPP is 
satisfied. 
 
PREDICTIONS 
 According to equation 2.3 the expected rate of depreciation of a currency is determined by the 
speed of the adjustment parameter and the gap between the current exchange rate and its long 
run value. If S is above Ŝ then it is anticipated that the local currency will appreciate. 
Conversely if the spot rate is below its long run value, the currency will be expected to 
depreciate. 
 
 In the long run the exchange rate will be determined by relative prices of goods between 
countries. 
 
WEAKNESSES 
The major weakness of this model like other asset theories is that there is no role for the 
current account in determining the exchange rate when in real life since exchange rates have an 
impact on the current account.  
The other problem is that this model omits a range of assets and only considers money. 
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THE PORTFOLIO BALANCE MODEL (PBM) 
The PBM is a dynamic exchange rate determination model which is hinged upon the interplay of 
asset markets, current account balance, prices and the rate of asset accumulation. It introduces 
the current account aspect which monetary models did not capture. The current account plays a 
prominent role in the exchange rate determination while the exchange rate affects the trade 
balance and current account and hence the net foreign assets.     
Here the central role of wealth variables is recognized; economic agents allocate their wealth   
among different assets, and the proportion of each asset held depends on the risk and   return 
assessments economic agents make. 
 
 ASSUMPTIONS 
 Three assets are held by economic agents and authorities. These are domestic monetary 
base (M), domestic bonds denominated in the domestic currency (B) and foreign bonds 
denominated in foreign currency (F). 
 Domestic and foreign assets are imperfect substitutes. Therefore uncovered interest 
parity does not hold. 
 Domestic prices and output are fixed following a policy disturbance. 
 The country concerned is too small to influence world exchange rates. 
 Money demand depends not only on income but also on wealth and interest rates. 
 Net exports are a positive function of the real exchange rate. 
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SHORT RUN EQUILIBRIUM 
The total wealth (W) of economic agents consists of the domestic monetary base (M), domestic 
bonds (B) and foreign bonds as follows (F); 
   
 W= M + B+ F........................................... (2.4) 
The short run equilibrium is given by: 
B*= T( S/P) + i* B*                            T› 0      ........(2.5) 
Where B* capital account  
i* B*    is the net debt service receipts. 
      
The short run equation (2.5) shows the rate of change of the capital account as equal to the   
current account which is also in turn equal to the sum of the trade balance and net debt service 
receipts.  This means that the trade balance depends positively on the level of the real 
exchange rate. 
 
When domestic interest rates rise, economic agents adjust their portfolio by substituting 
domestic for foreign bonds. This causes the demand for foreign assets to decline and the money 
realised from selling foreign assets is converted into the domestic currency which results into 
the fall of the spot rate. 
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LONG RUN EQUILIBRIUM                    
 In the long run, it is the interplay between the real sector and the financial markets that lead 
the economy to its long run status. Equilibrium in the long run takes place when the domestic 
price level and the quantity of foreign bonds are such that there is a zero balance on the current 
account. At this point there is no accumulation or de-cummulation of wealth. When the current 
account is in balance the rate of change in the exchange rate will be zero. 
 CA= T(S/P) + i* B* 
Where T (.) is a function of competitiveness............... (2.6)  
 A current account surplus (deficit) is associated with a domestic currency appreciation 
(depreciation) which tends to eliminate the surplus (deficit). This means that in the long run 
exchange rate determination is a macroeconomic problem involving the interaction of goods and 
asset markets. 
 
  PREDICTIONS   
 
The model predicts that certain monetary authority policy actions have short-run effects on the 
exchange rate. 
 
 Firstly, when monetary authorities embark on expansionary foreign exchange operations by 
buying foreign bonds from the private sector, this will increase the sector‟s holdings of money 
but a downfall of foreign bonds. This will lead Copeland (2008) to a downward adjustment of 
interest rates and a rise in the  price  of foreign currency and therefore currency 
depreciation. 
 
 Expansionary open market operations which increase the private sectors holdings of money and 
reduction of domestic bonds will lead to domestic currency depreciation and a fall in domestic 
interest rates. 
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The difference between this and the first is qualitative rather than quantitative Copeland (2008)) 
Monetary authorities can also embark an expansionary foreign exchange activity but accompany 
this with contractionary open market operations by first purchasing foreign assets with domestic 
money base and the offset the increase in the money supply by selling domestic bonds (sterilized 
foreign exchange intervention). The short run effect of this policy measure is that it will 
increase the supply of domestic bonds but decrease the private sector‟s levels of foreign assets. 
The result is a depreciation of the exchange rate and a rise in interest rates.  
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CHANNELS OF INTERVENTION. 
2.1.4 PORTFOLIO BALANCE CHANNEL 
In line with the portfolio balance model discussed, this channel postulates that investors hold 
three types of assets in different proportions and because foreign and domestic assets are 
imperfect substitutes, central bank intervention which alters the asset supplies relative 
outstanding supply of domestic assets will require a change in the expected relative returns. 
This will culminate in a change of the exchange rate. 
 
2.1.5 THE SIGNALLING CHANNEL 
This channel was developed by Mussa (1981). He started from the general monetarist view of 
exchange rates being assets. This asset market view of exchange rates postulated that exchange 
rates as relative assets prices like other assets were impacted upon by current events as well as 
the market‟s expectation of future events. Therefore, they changed from time to time due to 
the receipt of new information that changed the market‟s view of the economically appropriate 
exchange rate. 
 
  FIVE FEATURES OF EXCHANGE RATES  
 Mussa identified five key features of the asset market view of exchange rates: 
 The exchange rate being a relative price of two highly durable currencies means that the 
prevailing exchange rate is conceived by the market to be linked to future exchanges rates. The 
market knows that the fundamentals determining the prevailing exchange rate will also to a 
greater extent affect the future rates. 
 
The central bank can control the supply of currencies in an economy, therefore the central 
bank‟s monetary policy is of first order of importance for the behaviour of exchange rates. 
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Market participants hold different types of currencies depending on the expected returns. These 
participants change their currency portfolios according to differences in returns and this 
currency substitution has an impact on the exchange rate. 
 
There is inefficiency in the foreign exchange market. This entails that the prevailing exchange 
rates are not a result of full available information and there are opportunities for some 
participants to make extraordinary profits. 
 
Exchange rates play a vital role in responding to changes in real economic conditions. Changes in 
exchange rates indicate innovations in the trade balance which convey new information that 
changes the market‟s beliefs concerning the present and future behaviour of the real economic 
factors that ultimately determine the behaviour of the trade balance and the equilibrium 
relative price of one country are output in terms of the outputs of other countries. 
 
Mussa argued that exchange rates could provide a very useful indicator of monetary policy in the 
place of market interest rates in that a policy that links positive changes in the domestic money 
supply to positive changes in the foreign exchange value of domestic money ought to offset 
fluctuations in the demand to hold domestic money.  
One principal channel that pure central bank foreign exchange market intervention can impact 
on the exchange rate is influencing the expectations of non-official economic agents over the 
likely future behaviour of exchange rates. The effect of expectation may stem from intervention 
itself or from information that such intervention provides concerning the likely future behaviour 
of monetary and exchange rate policies. 
 
 
However, this effect on exchange rates is only in the short run and not in the long –run. 
Market participants are influenced by bandwagon effects that may culminate into volatility of 
the exchange rate 
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The central bank has control over money supply and has knowledge about its future monetary 
policy which market participants do not have. The central bank therefore may intervene in the 
foreign exchange market to guide the behaviour of exchange rates in line with its long–run 
monetary policy. There is a moral hazard in intervention in that market participants will not 
always believe that central bank pronouncements about future policy and will undertake 
measures that minimize their risk. Through sterilized intervention, the central bank signals 
future monetary policy, the market by observing this intervention expands its information set 
and changes its expectations of the existing and future exchange rates. When the participants 
revise their expectations of future fundamentals, they also revise their expectations of future 
spot exchange rates which in turn changes the existing exchange rate. If the central bank 
intervenes by buying the domestic currency, market participants will change their perceptions 
about future monetary policy and anticipate a tighter monetary policy in the future. This will 
translate consequently in the appreciation of the local currency. 
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2.1.6 THE ORDER FLOW (MICROSTRUCTURE) CHANNEL 
The contradiction between the traditional macroeconomic approach to exchange rate 
determination and reality obtaining in foreign exchange markets led to a growing interest in the 
market microstructure. 
 
According to this model, a more realistic description of the foreign exchange market 
microstructure is obtained by relaxing the assumption of identical agents, perfect information or 
costless trading and identifying the economic effects of the organisation of foreign exchange 
market. The market microstructure might help sort out some of the empirical problems of 
conventional models discussed earlier. 
 
In a ground breaking work on this model, Bacchetta and Van Wincoop (2006) were worried about 
the poor explanatory power of exchange rate determination theories. They therefore set about 
to provide an alternative model which could help resolve the exchange rate puzzle. 
 
ASSUMPTIONS 
 Market participants are heterogeneous. This comes about in that there are different 
investors who differ in terms of information about future macroeconomic fundamentals 
and have different exchange rate risk exposure associated with non-asset income. 
 Some information relevant to exchange rates is not publicly available. 
 There are differences in the trade mechanisms affected prices. 
 A small amount of hedge trades can become the dominant source of exchange volatility 
when information is heterogeneous while there is no impact when investors have common 
information. 
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SHORT RUN 
This heterogeneity disconnects the exchange rate from observed fundamentals in the short run. 
Secondly, there is a close relationship between the exchange rate and order flow over all time 
horizons. Rational confusion plays a vital role in the disconnection process. Investors are not 
sure whether the increase in the exchange rate is brought about by an improvement in average 
private signals about future fundamentals or an increase in unobserved hedge trades have an 
amplified effect on the exchange rate given that they are confused with changes in average 
private signals about future fundamentals.  
                                 
   LONG RUN 
In the long run rational confusion disappears and investors learn about future fundamentals and 
so there is a close link between the exchange rate and the observed fundamentals. The impact 
of unobserved hedge trades on the equilibrium price will therefore gradually weaken culminating 
to a closer long –run relationship between the exchange rate and observed fundamentals. 
ΔP = g(X, I, Z).........................................2.7 
Where ΔP is the change in the nominal exchange rate between two transactions. 
X is the order flow 
I is the inventory cost 
Z is the other micro determinants. 
According to the above equation (2.7) customers learn about fundamentals from direct sources, 
which they use to impact on order flow and then dealers learn about fundamentals from the 
behaviour of order flows. Eventually, this affects the trading process and finally the price. 
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2.2         EMPIRICAL REVIEW  
Central banks have been intervening in the foreign exchange market ever since the early 1970s. 
The practice that initially started with the G-5 countries has now spread all over the world and 
while developed countries rarely intervene in their foreign exchange markets, developing and 
emerging market economies have pushed up their levers in as far as the practice of intervention 
is concerned. The key question that has always been asked is whether this intervention does 
intend achieve its objectives of reversing trends or reducing currency volatility. This question 
has been empirically tested over the years and therefore there exists a large body of knowledge 
on the topic.  
The empirical results produced my concerned studies have been mixed. Some studies have 
produced evidence that intervention has an impact on both the level and volatility of the 
exchange rate while others have found that intervention is actually ineffective. 
This chapter provides a critical review of these studies. 
  
 
One of the very first studies on the effectiveness of central bank intervention on exchange rates 
came through a report of a study commissioned by the G7 economic summit at Versailles in 1982. 
The Jurgensen Report (1983) concluded that intervention effects were very small and only 
occurred in the short-run. 
Another study by Bordo and Schwartz (1991) agreed with the Jurgensen Report. They tested the 
portfolio balance channel by calculating standard deviations of the daily United States dollar ($) 
/ Germany mark (M) as well as the $/ Japanese yen (Y) exchange rates. They found that there 
was no evidence that intervention worked and the study concluded that intervention only 
increased foreign exchange market uncertainty. 
Therefore, the consensus among policy makers and academics during that time was that 
intervention was ineffective and if at all it was its effects were only in the short-run. 
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The major problem with these early studies was that the researchers did not use real high 
frequency intervention data provided by central banks. During this period central banks were 
very secretive in their intervention operations and so they did not release their intervention 
data to researchers or indeed the market. So most researchers instead, used proxies of various 
kinds as intervention variables. Expectedly therefore their results were not really reliable. Bordo 
and Schwart‟s methodology of standard deviation is not a very good econometric model and as 
such its estimates are likely to be biased and inefficient. 
Sarno and Taylor (2001) reviewed the various channels of intervention and the empirical studies 
that had been done in the area of central bank intervention. They opined that due to poor 
quality of data in the early studies conducted in the 1980s; most empirical studies indicated that 
intervention was ineffective.  
 
On the other hand in the 1990s the veil of secrecy was removed and central banks became more 
open and transparent: they released intervention data to the market on a regular and timely 
basis. Studies done in this dispensation seem to suggest that central bank intervention is 
effective. 
 
 A number of studies were undertaken to test the signalling channel hypothesis and most of them 
concluded that there was evidence that intervention affected the exchange rate through this 
channel. 
 
In this regard, Dominguez (1990) examined 3G central banks‟ foreign exchange interventions 
operations. She studied intervention activities of the 3G countries namely the United States of 
America (U.S.A), Germany and Japan for the period from 1985 to 1987. Her aim was to establish 
whether or not unilateral and coordinated intervention operations influenced market operations. 
She used newspaper accounts of intervention to develop an ex-post excess returns model under 
the framework of the signalling channel hypothesis. She defined ex-post excess returns as the 
realised return that market participants made by borrowing from one institution and lending to 
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another. Intervention was construed to signify conveyance of central bank credible inside 
information to the market about future monetary policy. The study found that coordinated 
intervention operations consistently impacted on the longer term market expectations. However, 
the results were mixed in as far as unilateral interventions by the Federal Reserve and the 
Bundesbank on influencing ex post excess returns was concerned.  The evidence presented 
indicated that market participants were overall able to observe the source and size of 
intervention and this had a significant economic and statistical effect on market expectations.  
 
The above findings are supported by another study conducted by Dominguez (1998) herself. She 
again used the signalling channel to examine the impact of central bank‟s intervention on daily 
and short –term behaviour of exchange rate volatility. Her sample period ranged from 1977 to 
1994 and included the U.S.A, Germany and Japan. Using data from the three central banks in 
relation to $/Y and $/M markets, she constructed a GARCH conditional variance model to 
measure ex-post daily and weekly volatility. Her results were quite robust and fundamentally 
her GARCH parameters were highly significant. The study revealed that for the mid 1980 sub 
period, for example, for both the dollar –mark and dollar –yen, central banks‟ interventions 
reduced volatility and the Bundesbank interventions overall  reduced dollar-mark and dollar –yen 
volatility during the sample period. The study also brought out a very important fact that 
intervention need not be publicly announced for it to be effective. Secret intervention was also 
effective in calming volatility.   
 
Another set of researchers namely Kaminsky and Lewis (1996) also lent support to the efficacy of 
the intervention through the signalling channel. They examined the signalling channel hypothesis 
to test whether or not the Federal Reserve‟s intervention activities implied changes in future 
monetary policy. They also examined the effect of intervention on the exchange rate. Using data 
on market observations from the financial press of foreign exchange rate intervention by the Fed 
for the period September 1985 to February 1990 and testing whether or not intervention 
provided no information about future policy, the duo found that intervention provided 
significant information about future changes in monetary policy.  
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However, the results conflicted with the traditional signalling hypothesis in that despite 
intervention providing significant information about future policy, most of the information came 
from interventions to sell the $ that were followed by tight monetary policy. Further, evidence 
showed that major movements in the exchange rates occurred after interventions depended on 
whether the interventions were consistent with future monetary policy. This sample dependent 
evidence emanated from the sample dependent nature of monetary and intervention policy. 
Therefore during periods when intervention was perceived to be consistent with the direction of 
future monetary policy, the results of intervention were effective while in other periods it was 
not.  All in all intervention did signal future monetary policy though on a number of occasions 
this signal was in the opposite direction 
Fatum and Hutchison (1999B) slightly differed with the work of Dominguez, Kaminsky and Lewis.  
They used an event study methodology to assess the Germany„s Bundesbank and Federal Reserve 
bank‟s intervention operations in the foreign exchange market on the M/$. They covered the 
period from 1st September 1985 to 31st December 1995. They contended that intervention 
affected the exchange rate only in the short run. They however, did agree that there was 
evidence that intervention signalled future monetary policy.  
 
The major weakness in the methodology employed by Fatum and Hutchison is that it did not 
allow for a specific channel of intervention and they interpreted their results to mean there was 
a signalling of future monetary policy.  The other weakness of the event study methodology is 
that the problem of endogeneity. This arises since central banks take the decision to intervene 
on the basis of observed exchange rate trends. 
 
Neely (2005) raised very important concerns over the event study methodology that most 
researchers including Fatum and Hutchison, Domingeuz and Frankel (1993) had employed in 
examining the impact of intervention on exchange rates. He stated that to establish the effect 
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of intervention on the exchange rate, researchers ought to consider how all variables that affect 
exchange rates and intervention interact. Most of these studies employing the event study were 
plagued with simultaneity bias. Estimates of   were inconsistent because intervention was 
related with the error term. 
He concluded by saying that  even nonparametric event studies were still  subject to all the 
econometric problems that beset more conventional econometric procedures.  To improve the 
event study methodology where inferring of structural effects is concerned, researchers were 
supposed to lay fairly strong conditions. 
 
 
Fatum and Hutchison (1999A) contradicted the studies that had supported the signalling channel 
hypothesis. This particular study investigated the linkages between U.S. daily intervention 
operations and the expected changes in future monetary policy. To do this they used the time 
varying GARCH methodology and the sample period was 27th March 1989 to 31st December 1993.  
They used daily Federal Reserve data on sales and purchases of currencies and investigated 
whether this affected the Federal Funds Futures Rate. They found that intervention did not 
convey a clear signal about future monetary policy. Therefore the signalling story was not very 
clear and further that intervention led to greater monetary uncertainty. 
 
Kim et al (2000) used the Exponential GARCH methodology to study the effectiveness of the 
Reserve Bank of Australia‟s intervention of the United States Dollar/ Australian Dollar exchange 
rate. Studying intervention activities for the period 1983- 1997, they found that RBA intervention 
had some success as there was evidence of a stabilising influence on the exchange rate. In 
particular, purchases of the Australian dollar tended to strengthen the currency and reduced its 
volatility. 
Aguilar and Nydahl (2000) the Swedish‟s Riksbank‟s foreign exchange market interventions for 
the period between January 1993 – 1996. They used actual daily data from the central bank to 
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estimate a GARCH model and implied volatilities from currency options. They were examining 
the krona/mark and krona/USD exchange rates. The results were mixed. They found that the 
interventions depreciated the krona though the magnitude was small. Secondly, the effects of 
interventions on volatility were not significant and the estimated coefficients of the intervention 
variable were negative. However, for the 1995 and 1996 intervention had significant effects on 
the krona/mark and krona/usd exchange rates. For the whole period no significant effect of 
intervention was found. 
 
A number of studies were also conducted to test the microstructure channel of intervention.  
 
Dominguez (2003A) examined the effectiveness of central bank intervention in relation to the 
state of the market under the auspices of the market microstructure channel at the time of 
intervention. To do this she used Reuters intra-daily data in the $-Mark and $-Yen markets of the 
3G‟s intervention activities (U.S., Germany and Japan). The study covered the 1987-1995 time 
period.   
Using the event study approach her empirical results indicated that Federal Reserve (Fed) 
intervention activities significantly affected both the $-Mark and $-Yen intra-day returns and 
volatility and these effects persisted at least to the end of the day. There was also evidence 
that Fed interventions that occurred when the US and European markets were open had larger 
effects than those that took place at other times. In terms of the state of the market at the 
time of intervention, the study supported the hypothesis that the effectiveness of central bank 
intervention depended on the state of the market. All in all there was evidence that central 
bank interventions influenced intra daily foreign exchange volatility. 
 
Again as pointed out by Neely (2005) Dominguez‟s event study methodology employed in this 
study is also subject to the same criticism of simultaneity bias and therefore the conclusions 
drawn are not as robust as they are suggested. 
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Another of her studies Dominguez (2003B) of the foreign exchange intervention activities of the 
3G central banks from 1990 to 2002 supported her earlier contention that intervention is 
effective. This time her focus was both on the very short term and long term impacts of 
intervention episodes. She found that the Fed‟s dollar purchases during 1992 to 1995 resulted in 
the M/$ rate coming down while the $ did rise.  She also found evidence which was suggesting 
that oordinated interventions proved to be very successful as the Euro appreciated by 2 
percentage points and the intervention effects lasted longer than forty eight hours.  
 
Further, Dominguez (2006) analysed the influence of interventions on exchange rate volatility.  
She studied the United States of America‟s (Federal Reserve Bank) activities in the deusmark- 
dollar and Japanese yen/ dollar foreign market from August August 1989 to August 1995.  Her 
study used the microstructure approach developed by Bacchetta and Van Wincoop (2006). Her 
main focus was to try to explain short term currency movements which conventiononal exchange 
rate models had failed to explain. 
 
She used intra day FX FX Reuters data to construct an event study methodology to study the 
impact of central bank interventions. Her results pointed to the fact that intervention by the 
three banks influenced volatility up to 1 hour before the Reuters announcement. The results also 
showed that public announcements by the Federal Reserve Bank that it was going to intervene 
also significantly impacted on volatility. Her coefficients on intervention were positive which 
demonstrated that in the short –run central bank interventions were linked to increases in 
volatility. These short run effects were as a result of the heterogeneity of market participants in 
terms of accessing information which is in line with the postulates of the microstructure theory. 
She found that in the long run however, central bank interventions had no effect because in that 
time horizon information had been acquired by all market participants and consequently 
volatility returned to its pre –intervention level. 
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Beine, Benassy- Quere and Lecourt (2002) assessed the effects of the U.S, Germany and 
Japanese central banks‟ intervention on the evolution and volatility of the daily M/$ and 
Y/$ exchange rates. They covered the 1985 to1995 time period and used the FIGARCH 
methodology as a measure of volatility. They found that central bank interventions had a 
significant impact on the conditional mean of the exchange rate variations though net purchases 
of currencies were associated with subsequent depreciation of the currencies. This finding was 
in line with findings of previous studies by Almekinders and Eijffiner (1993) and others. This 
meant that what actually happened was leaning –against –the wind. Evidence showed that 
intervention increased volatility across all the three banks over some sub –periods which 
supported the microstructure channel where market participants test the central bank‟s 
determination after an intervention activity. 
The study also lent support to the effectiveness of secret interventions in effecting exchange 
rate variations. In contrast reported interventions increased volatility of the exchange rates. 
Coordinated interventions, like purchase of the $, was significantly associated with the following 
$ depreciation and was more powerful in influencing the exchange rates than individualised 
interventions. Overall, the study concluded that publicly reported interventions moved the 
market in albeit in the wrong direction and like many other studies discovered, intervention was 
found to increase volatility in the short –run. 
 
The portfolio balance channel was put to a number of empirical tests and the results were also 
quite encouraging. 
 
Dominguez and Frankel (1993B) investigated the impact of central bank intervention using the 
portfolio balance channel. They covered a period of 6 years (1982-1988) and studied the 
intervention activities of the fed, Bundesbank and Switzerland National Bank. They abandoned 
the conventional portfolio balance specification and instead used an alternative method that 
used 4 –week ahead survey forecasts from Money Market Services. Their model was based on 
instrumental variables so as to avoid the simultaneity bias and other econometric estimation 
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difficulties. The coefficients on intervention were overall statistically significant. Therefore the 
effects of central bank intervention on the exchange rate the portfolio channel were effective.  
 
Supporting the above study ,Eijffringer (1998) studied the $ in relation to exchange rates of the 
Working Group countries (Germany, Japan, Canada, France and Italy) from 2nd January 1978 to 
30th July 1982. Using the additive decomposition of time-series methodology, his main interest 
was to establish whether intervention by a single central bank in the Group had the same impact 
relative to joint intervention.  Though his results were mixed, there was evidence that sterilized 
intervention did affect the exchange rate through the portfolio balance channel. He also found 
evidence that joint/coordinated intervention was more effective than a single country‟s 
intervention. 
Frenkel and Pierdzioch (2005) examined the effects of the Bank of Japan (BOJ) intervention of 
the Y/$ volatility for the 1993-2000 period. One remarkable difference between this study and 
others was that the data used was official data obtained from the BOJ while the previous studies 
had used inaccurate reports contained in the financial press. They used volatilities implicit in 
foreign currency options as a measure of volatility and used a model similar to Dominguez (1998) 
and Tanner (1996). They found that there was a statistically significant positive link between the 
interventions and the yen/$ volatility. The study also revealed that the mere presence of the 
BOJ in the foreign exchange market contributed to the exchange rate volatility. Concerning 
empirical tests on the effect of expected exchange rate volatility and press reports of BOJ 
intervention, their results demonstrated that interventions that were done secretly and 
therefore not reported in the press were positively correlated with exchange rate volatility. 
 
 
 
 
 
 
  44 
A number of studies have revealed that central bank intervention does not actually calm 
volatility but instead it increases the volatility behaviour of exchange rates.  
 
A study conducted by Bonser-Neal (1996) like many others testify to this fact. Bonser-Neal used 
options data from the Philadelphia Stock Exchange for the period 1985 to 1991 to study volatility 
of the M/$ and Y/$ in response to central bank intervention and other economic variables. Her 
study measured exchange volatility using implied volatility derived from foreign currency options. 
Her model was built around two equations which she estimated using data from the Bundesbank 
and Federal Reserve. During the sample period there was no evidence that central bank 
intervention reduced exchange rate volatility rather that volatility actually increased. However, 
during the post-Louvre period intervention decreased volatility to some degree though generally 
the result was that it had no effect.  Her results pointed to the different effects of intervention 
during different sub –periods. The M/$ and Y/$ volatility increased during the Louvre period but 
decreased in the subsequent period. 
 
Humpage (1999) used the logit model to study the Federal Reserve Bank of New York‟s 
intervention operations against the mark and yen from 18th February 1987 to 23rd February 1990. 
His empirical results suggested that the U.S. intervention successfully leaned against the wind in 
that the depreciation of the $ was reversed. His results also suggested that coordinated 
intervention was more successful at affecting the exchange rate than uncoordinated intervention. 
 
Another study that supported the portfolio balance channel was done by Ghosh (1992). He used 
monthly data from 1980 -1988 to examine the effectiveness of the Federal Reserve intervention 
activities on the $ -M exchange rate. He controlled for signalling and discovered that the 
coefficients for the portfolio balance variables were significant. He therefore concluded that 
there was some evidence that the portfolio balance channel was an effective channel for 
intervention. However, he put a proviso that for intervention to be effective the magnitude of 
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intervention needed to be high. His example was that about $13 billion of intervention was 
required to move the $/M exchange rate by 0.15 t 0.35 per cent. 
 
 Despite the encouraging results obtained by the above –mentioned studies Sarno and Taylor 
(2001) revealed that these studies that tested the portfolio balance channel faced number 
insurmountable problems. They pointed out that translating the theoretical framework of the 
channel in real financial terms was very difficult. This made the portfolio balance channel less 
attractive to the signalling channels and consequently PBC was going to be abandoned to the 
backyard while the signalling channel would become more prominent. However, they did point 
out that on a general level  evidence on intervention was mixed though in the recent past most 
researches were beginning to suggest that intervention had some effect on both the level and 
volatility of the exchange rates establish  
 
Literature on the impact of central bank intervention on the exchange rate has recently 
recognized that emerging market economies are intervening more in foreign exchange rate 
markets than developed countries. There is also some evidence which seems to suggest that 
intervention is more effective in former countries than former ones. This is mainly due to the 
structural differences that exist between these economies. Financial sectors in emerging 
economies are underdeveloped and thin therefore central bank intervention is bound to have a 
significant impact on the overall foreign exchange market. 
 
It should also be pointed out that because of the nature of foreign exchange markets in these 
emerging markets it is very difficult to identify a single channel that could be used to study 
central bank intervention and let alone explicitly identify as a channel through which 
intervention affected the exchange rate. Therefore, most studies are of a general nature. 
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One emerging market economies study was done by Edison, Cashin and Liang (2003). They 
examined intervention activities of the Reserve Bank of Australia (RBA) from January 1984 – 
December 2001 to try to see the effect of intervention on the level and volatility of the 
exchange rate. They used the event study methodology and the GARCH to study the impact on 
the level and volatility respectively. They found that intervention did not consistently influence 
the level of the exchange rate but it was successful in reversing a trend. Concerning volatility, 
the evidence suggested that the RBA was successful in smoothing the exchange rate. 
 
This evidence contradicts the majority of studies conducted in developed countries and 
highlighted above which seem to suggest that central bank intervention actually increases 
exchange rate volatility. This result from Edison et al is very pertinent to the subject of this 
paper in that Zambia is also a developing country. Therefore, we expect to find evidence that 
intervention will reduce volatility. 
 Another developing country study was by Disyatat and Galati (2005). The duo studied the impact 
of the Czech National Bank (CNB)‟s intervention operations on level, volatility and rock reversal 
of the koruna/euro exchange rate from 2001-2002. Their results indicated that intervention had 
some effects albeit weakly statistically significant impact on the exchange rate but there was no 
evidence that intervention had influence on short –term exchange volatility. These results 
supported assertions that the portfolio balance and microstructure channels were more potent in 
emerging market economies than industrial ones. 
 
Again, Domac and Mendoza( 2004) used the Exponential GARCH to study the efficacy of the 
Turkish and Mexican central bank interventions on the $/peso and $/Lira exchange rates for the 
periods 1st August 1996- 29th June 2001 ( Mexico) and 22nd February 2001 and 30th May 2002 
respectively.  The evidence from the study suggested that overall intervention had a highly 
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significant impact on the exchange rates. The mere presence of central bank in the foreign 
exchange market also had an impact on the exchange rate. 
This evidence tarries with evidence adduced in studies done in developed countries it appears to 
suggest that perhaps signalling and the microstructure channels are also relevant for developing 
countries. 
There is very little that has been done in terms of empirical studies in Zambia. The only study 
was done by Simatele (2004). She used GARCH (1, 1) to investigate whether or not the Bank of 
Zambia‟s intervention activities from 1997-2003 had any influence on the k/$ exchange rate. Her 
evidence showed that cumulative intervention led to a depreciation of the exchange rate but it 
reduced volatility of the exchange rate. In this regard, the BOZ was successful its objective of 
smoothing kwacha volatilities. 
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CHAPTER 3: EXCHANGE RATE POLICY IN ZAMBIA 
3.1 BACKGROUND 
Zambia is a landlocked country located in Sub –Saharan Africa and with an area of around 
752,618 kms. The country‟s main economic mainstay since gaining independence from Great 
Britain on 24th October 1964 has been export of copper and other minerals. This is also the main 
source of foreign exchange for the country.  The population has been growing at around 2.1 % 
annually and at the end of 2008 it was estimated to be around 12.450 million.  
As figure 3.1 shows the economy has been recovering from negative growth of -2.82 in 1995 to 
6.02% in 2008. The main drivers for this relatively high growth rate are partially attributed to 
the high production and export of minerals as a result of the general high metal prices during 
the boom period. 
 
Figure 2: GDP GROWTH RATE IN ZAMBIA 1995- 2008 
 
 
Despite this impressive Gross Domestic Product (G.D.P) growth rates, the country‟s current 
account has remained in deficit. As can be seen from Figure 3.2 from 1995 to 2008 the country 
has recorded negative figures. In 1995 the current account deficit was $ 0.145 billion. In 2008 it 
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was $1.054 billion.  Purchasing Power Parity (PPP) GDP has however, being increasing over the 
years. In 1995 it was £7.59 billion while it rose to $10.68billion in 2002 and in 2008 it was around 
$17.423 billion. 
Consumer Price Index (CPI) inflation too has been relatively high. In 1995 it was 45.98%, though 
it started declining after that. It dropped by almost 10% the following year. In 2007 it reduced to 
a record low of 8.9% but it went up the following year to 16.6%. 
 Figure 3: ZAMBIA CURRENT ACCOUNT POSITION (1995-2008) 
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3.2. AN ACCOUNT OF FOREIGN EXCHANGE REGIMES IN ZAMBIA 
1964 -1985: Fixed Exchange System 
 
From independence the official currency in Zambia was the Zambian pound which  
was administratively pegged to the British pound and was fully convertible. On 16th January 1968, 
the official currency was changed to the kwacha and was pegged to the British pound sterling 
until 3rd December 1971 when it linked to the US dollar at the rate of K0.714/USD. This 
represented a devaluation given the kwacha‟s appreciation against the dollar following a de 
factor devaluation of the $ unit on 15th August 1971. 
 
On 8th July 1976, ties with the $ were severed and the kwacha was linked to the special drawing 
rights (SDR) at SDR1.08479. However, this peg lasted only up To 6th July 1983. After that a 
crawling peg based on a basket of currencies of five major trading partners of Zambia was 
introduced. Under that arrangement, the kwacha was allowed to adjust but within a narrow 
range. 
 
1985 -1987: Auctioning System 
In October 1985, an auctioning system based on marginal bid was introduced as a way of 
determining the exchange rate and allocating foreign exchange due to declining copper revenues 
and a mounting external debt. The spot exchange rate was K2.2/$ reaching K5.01 in the first 
weekly auction and 11th October 1986 it was at K8.30. During this system the kwacha 
depreciated by 86%. On 2nd August 1986 a „Dutch Auction‟ replaced the auction system and BOZ 
increased the amount of foreign exchange. However, this system was short-lived and it was 
suspended in January 1987 when the spot rate increased (depreciated) to a K15/$ level, after 
which the exchange rate system reverted to the fixed regime of the past.   
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1987- 1991: Two-Tier System (Fixed and flexible Systems) 
In April 1987, the monetary authorities introduced a two-tier system.  The first tier which was 
an administratively determined rate was used for official transactions and while a flexible 
exchange rate system (auction system) was used for the remainder of transactions. Due to a 
drastic depreciation of the second tier kwacha exchange rate(K40/$), the auctioning system was 
abandoned in May 1987 and replaced by a fixed exchange rate system administered by the 
Foreign Exchange Management Committee (FEMAC). The exchange rate was then set to K9/$. In 
1990 the FEMAC was restructured and an Open General License (OGL) system introduced.  A dual 
exchange rate system comprising the official and unofficial (retail and OGL) windows was 
adopted and managed by FEMAC.  The exchange rate on the official window was lower than the 
black market one.   
 
In October 1991, a new party the Movement for Multiparty Democracy (MMD) won presidential 
elections on the platform of a shift from socialism orientation that the previous government had 
been leaning towards to a capitalist and neo liberal pragmatic orientation. This new government 
therefore embarked on a number of economic and financial reforms which included the 
management of the exchange rate system. As a result, due to the economic liberalisation agenda, 
the OGL, retail and the official windows were unified as a precursor to full liberalisation the 
foreign exchange market and exchange rate regime. 
 
 
   1992 – 2008: Flexible Exchange Rate 
 
In 1992, the OGL list was expanded but was later abolished in December 1994 when the 
Exchange Control Act was repealed. In January 1994 kwacha became fully convertible.  Other 
notable changes were the introduction of bureaux de change system and elimination of capital 
controls. In 1995 commercial banks were also allowed to maintain foreign exchange accounts. 
As a way of determining the exchange rate, a dealing system was put into place.  This is a broad 
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based market determined foreign exchange interbank market and has been operational since 
mid-July 2003. The official rate is now the average of the rates of the major players in the 
interbank market who include commercial banks and bureau de changes. The system allows 
commercial banks to buy and sell foreign exchange from the central bank. The Bank of Zambia 
determines the official exchange rates through an auction held at the Bank whereas commercial 
banks determine their inter-bank and customer (retail and corporate) rates prevailing in the 
market based on the cost of acquisition of their foreign exchange. Though individual financial 
institutions decide on the appropriate exchange rates to use for particular transactions, it is the 
Bank of Zambia's responsibility to ensure the publication and dissemination of average exchange 
rates of financial institutions and those prevailing at the Bank of Zambia.  
 
 
The official exchange rate is determined by the dealing‟s weighted average exchange rate. The 
BOZ buying rate is the simple average of the primary dealers low bid rates while the selling rate 
is the simple average of the primary dealers high offer rates. The International Monetary Fund 
(IMF) Zambian Country Report (2008) described the Zambia‟s exchange regime has been a 
managed float which was broadly in line with the macroeconomic fundamentals.  
The BOZ was said to be committed to a flexible exchange system though it would intervene from 
time to time to smooth fluctuations in the kwacha.   
 
The current (May 2009) k/$ exchange has increased to around K5, 300. 
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3.4 PARALLEL FOREIGN EXCHANGE BLACK MARKET. 
 
Zambia has over the years experienced a thriving a parallel black foreign exchange market. This 
market has existed side by side with the official foreign exchange rate market. 
 
The main reason for the emergence and blossoming of the parallel market was the 
macroeconomic regimes of the post –independence era and the many policy reversals that were 
undertaken by the former government. Price controls had been undertaken from independence 
to agricultural goods and other essential commodities.  Interest rates were also controlled for a 
considerable period of time until they became negative. The collapse of the copper prices and 
the early 1970s oil crises also fuelled a deterioration of Zambia‟s terms of trade. As a result of 
the restrictions on trade and foreign exchange, the sad phenomenon of misinvoicing ensued. 
 
These restrictions culminated into excess demand for foreign exchange leading to significant 
profit opportunities and growth of the black market. Some importers over-invoiced their imports 
in order to obtain extra currency which they sold at the black market for a profit.  
 
From the early 1980s, the country witnessed unprecedented illegal mining and export of 
emeralds. The foreign exchange earned through these illegal exports found its way into the 
black market.  
 
According to Aron and Elbadawi (1992) the overvalued exchange rate and foreign exchange 
controls created excess demand for the parallel foreign exchange market to flourish. The black 
market premium which is the ratio of the black market rate to the official rate was around 100% 
in the 1970 and by the early 1990s it was around 400%. The premium declined quickly and 
remarkably when the auction system was introduced from 68% in 1985 to 31% in 1986. However, 
in 1988 when the auction was suspended the premium soared to 418%. 
 
The constant devaluation of the kwacha fuelled the growth of the black market in that economic 
agents always expected that the kwacha would further be devalued and government would 
abandon its monetary and fiscal policies. 
 
As a matter of fact Aron and Elbadawi point out „the perceived incredibility or unsustainability 
of the auction program especially during 1985 and the following two years had a hand in the 
failures of the crawling peg and the auction regimes and  the ultimate collapse of the economic 
program in 1987‟ 
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Currently, because of the removal of controls, the liberalisation of trade and the introduction of 
a flexible exchange rate regime, the premium has tumbled down quite markedly though the 
black market is still an active part of the foreign exchange market in Zambia. 
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CHAPTER 4 DATA AND METHODOLOGY 
 
4.1    DATA DESCRIPTION 
 
The exchange rate data used in this study are monthly average mid quotes expressed as Zambian 
kwacha (K)/United States Dollar ($), so that a rise in the exchange rate is a depreciation of the K. 
Official intervention is defined as a sale (positive) or purchase (negative) of foreign assets in the 
foreign exchange market measured in $ in logs. Monthly exchange rate returns are calculated by 
taking the log difference of the K/$. 
Both intervention and exchange rate data were sourced from the Bank of Zambia. The exchange 
rate and intervention data are monthly in frequency and cover the period from January 1995 to 
December 2008. These data are published on the bank‟s official website with a month‟s lag. 
The data suggest an asymmetry in the nature of the BOZ‟s intervention operations specifically 
net purchases of $ are more frequent than sales though on average sales transactions tend to be 
larger. The frequency of intervention is discernibly much lower in the initial period of the 
sample period.  
To test for the unit root in the data we use the Augmented Dickey Fuller (ADF) Test and the 
results are shown in Tables 1 and 2 in the next chapter.  We could not reject the null hypothesis 
that exchange rate was non stationary at level. However, exchange rate series became 
stationary at first difference meaning it was integrated to order 1. The purchases data series 
were stationary but the sales data series were non stationary and integrated to order 1. 
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From 1995 to 2008 the BOZ entered the foreign exchange market on 196 occasions. The 
maximum amount of intervention was $90,800,000 while the minimum was $100,000. Of the 196 
occasions, BOZ entered the foreign exchange market 102 (52%) times to purchase the $ and only 
94 (48%) times to sell. The total volume of these interventions amounted to $3,021,139,000.40 
out of which $1,944,655,000 was sold to and $ 1,076,484.40 was purchased from the foreign 
exchange market. In 1995 and from 2001 to 2003 the BOZ intervened every month. 
In terms of $ sales the highest volume sold was $70,000,000 in December 2008.  The highest 
annual $ sold was in 1995 when BOZ sold a total of $ 473,200,000.00. The least annual sales 
occurred in 2005 when BOZ sold a paltry $5000. In terms of monthly sales the lowest was again 
in2005 where $200 was sold. 
 
 
Figure 4: BOZ SALES OF USD IN 000 (1995-2008) 
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In terms of purchases, the BOZ was more active in 2004, 2005, 2006 and 2007. It purchased 
$90,750,000.40, $ 127,100,000, $220,800,000=00 and $141,908,000=00 from the foreign 
exchange market respectively.  The lowest amount purchased was in 1998 when BOZ purchased 
$16,365. It is worth noting that in the years when purchases were high, the trend was such that 
BOZ sold less $ and purchased more $. 
 
 
FIGURE 5: BOZ PURCHASES OF USD IN 000 (1995-2008) 
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K688.65/$. This is the lowest in the sample period. Since then the exchange rate has been 
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 From then it trended around K4, 600 through to November 2005. In December 2005, it 
decreased quite significantly to around K3, 400 though this was short lived as it increased in 
September 2006. It closed at K4, 882.97 in December 2008. 
 
Figure 6: MONTHLY KWACHA AND USD EXCHANGE RATE (1998 -2008) 
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4.2. METHODOLOGY  
The main purpose of this study is to investigate the impact on intervention on both the level and 
volatility of the K/$ exchange rate.  
Volatility can be estimated using time series econometric techniques or market determined 
option prices. Previous studies have demonstrated that there exists temporal clustering in the 
variances of the exchange rate changes meaning that large changes are followed by equally 
large changes while small changes are followed by small changes.  
The study will first test for ARCH effects to establish whether or not indeed a GARCH family 
model is appropriate for these types of data. A test for ARCH effects reveals that we cannot 
reject the presence of ARCH effects in our data is therefore, the use of GARCH is justified1. The 
results are shown in Table 3. 
These have the advantage of estimating the conditional variance in that they give an ex post 
measure of weekly or daily volatility while the exchange rate options provide ex ante measure of 
volatility.  
This methodology enables us to test the impact of intervention on both the mean and 
conditional volatility of the exchange rate at the same time by modelling the heteroscedastic 
errors in our exchange rate equation.                                                                             
Further, there being no exchange rate options in existence in Zambia, the market determined 
option prices methodology cannot be used. 
However, the study will also use the GARCH (1,1) methodology to so that the estimates obtained 
can be compared to those obtained from the main methodology of the study namely EGARCH.  
 
                                               
1
 Using Eviews we obtained a probability value of 0.000 and use the rule of thumb at 5%level of significance to test the 
null hypothesis that there were ARCH effects 
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THE EFFECTS OF BOZ’S INTERVENTION ON THE VOLATILITY OF THE 
KWACHA  
Most central bank‟s rationale for intervention is the „calming of disorderly‟ exchange rate 
markets. In essence this entails arresting exchange rate volatility. 
This study will adopt the Exponential GARCH (EGARCH) methodology proposed by Nelson (1991) 
and used by Domac and Mendoza (2004) and Kim et al (2000) to model the overall effects of 
intervention and the individual sales and purchases. 
 
We propose the following process to model exchange rate returns and conditional volatility 
assuming that the error terms are drawn from a double exponential (DE) distribution: 
GARCH models are outperformed by fractionally integrated or long-memory processes and they 
tend to underestimate the intervention effects in terms of volatility (Beine et al 2002 and Domac 
and Mendoza 2004). 
 
Further, EGARCH has a number of advantages over the ordinary GARCH models which include the 
fact that the latter do not account for leverage effects and they imply that the impact of a 
volatility shock disappears over time at an exponential rate (Beine et al (2002).  
 
Enders (2004) revealed that EGARCH allows for asymmetric effects of shocks. In this case 
purchases and sales of foreign exchange are supposed to have asymmetric effects on the 
exchange rate. Unfortunately, GARCH being a symmetric model does not take that into account. 
Another weakness of GARCH is that it is necessary to ensure that all of the estimated 
coefficients are positive but EGARCH does not require non negativity constraints. 
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The E-GARCH allows for the inclusion of negative variables affecting volatility, which, in turn, 
makes it possible to analyze, the sales and purchases, components of the intervention activities. 
 
r t = ø 0  + ø sale sale + ø pur  purch + є t  
є t ~DE(0,σ
2
)   є t = є t σ t     є t ~ iid (0,1) 
In (σ 2 t ) = ω+ α (l є 1t l) +  (є 1t ) + β (In (σ
2
1t ) +  sale +  purch purch   ............. 4.1 
 
Where  
 r t    
 is equal to ΔInS t  (is the log change in the K/$ exchange rate between period t and 
 t-1)          
  SALE is BOZ sales of $  
           PURCH is BOZ purchase of $ 
γ is a leverage parameter 
 
PURCH will take a value of one when there is a purchase of dollars and zero otherwise, while 
SALES takes a value of minus one for every sale of dollars.  
This will ascertain the effects of BOZ intervention in frequency terms, by studying the response 
of the variance to the number of times BOZ sells or buys at the same time. 
 
The parameter α in the variance equation resembles the clustering effect showed by GARCH 
models.  
 γ allows the variance to respond differently following equal magnitude negative or positive 
shocks. 
 Volatility persistence is measured by β under the restriction that the estimate is smaller than 
one to avoid an explosive behaviour of the variance. 
To examine the asymmetric response of the variance to positive and negative 
innovations, we employ the News Impact Curve (NIC) by Engle and Ng (1993), which is as follows: 
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... 4.2 
 
As stated above our GARCH (1, 1) which will be compared with the above EGARCH model is as 
follows: 
ΔInS t = α + βInt t + ε t .......................................................4.3 
    ε t lΩ 1t ~iid (0,h t )...............................................................4.4 
 
h t = 0  +  1 h 1t  + 1 ε
2
1t + 2 І Int t І....................................4.5  
 
Where ΔInS t  is the log change in the K/$ exchange rate between period t and t-1. (A positive 
value is an appreciation of the K) 
Int t  is the variable that captures BOZ intervention activities. 
l l is the absolute value operator 
ε t  is the disturbance term. 
Equation 4.3 measures the direct effect of official intervention on the kwacha while equation 
4.4 states that the regression residuals will be modelled as a GARCH process. Equation 4.5 
describes the conditional variance. 
The model parameters will be estimated using the quasi-maximum likelihood approach 
developed by Bollerslev and Wooldridge (1992) which yields standard errors that are robust to 
nonnormality in the density function underlying residuals. 
  
According to Brooks (2002) to determine which model is appropriate we will use the Engle and 
Ng (1993) sign bias test.  This test will tell us whether an asymmetric (EGARCH) or symmetric 
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(GARCH) model is appropriate for our data series. This test is applied to the residuals of a 
GARCH returns data. It is based on the significance of 𝜱1 in the following equation: 
μ t = 𝜱 0 + 𝜱 1 S

1t  + υ t  
where υ t is an iid error term. If positive and negative shocks to μ 1t impact differently upon the 
conditional variance, then 𝜱 1 will be statistically significant. 
Our prior expectation on this score is that sales and purchases will affect the condition variance 
differently and therefore a model that care of this type of asymmetry, which in our case is 
EGARCH should be more appropriate. 
 
 
PRIOR EXPECTATIONS 
 Our expectation from this study is that BOZ‟s interventions are effective in reversing the 
depreciating trend of the kwacha. Further we expect that volatility of the kwacha will increase 
due to this intervention.  As pointed out by Disyatat and Galati(2005) one  would expect a priori 
that foreign exchange intervention in emerging market countries may be more effective because 
(i) the size of intervention relative to market turnover tends to be larger, (ii) the existence of 
some form of capital controls limiting access to international capital markets gives central banks 
in these countries greater leverage in the market, and (iii) the lower level of sophistication of 
the domestic market along with stringent reporting requirements may endow central banks with 
a greater informational advantage not only with respect to fundamentals but also aggregate 
order flows and net open positions of major traders. 
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CHAPTER 5:   RESULTS  
This section aims to assess whether Bank of Zambia interventions have any impact on the 
evolution of the exchange rate and its volatility. 
To this end, Tables 5 and 6 report the empirical results obtained from GARCH and EGARCH 
models respectively. They report central bank intervention effects on the conditional mean and 
variance.  
We however first present the results of our tests for unit root and ARCH effects in our data in 
Tables 2 reveals that ADF tests for the unit root shows that the exchange rate is nonstationary. 
After first difference, the exchange rate series does become stationary meaning that the series 
are integrated to the order 1(See Table 3) 
 
Table 2: ADF TESTS FOR THE EXCHANG RATE (AT LEVEL) 
 
Null Hypothesis: LER has a unit root  
Exogenous: Constant, Linear Trend  
Lag Length: 0 (Automatic based on SIC, MAXLAG=13) 
     
     
   t-Statistic   Prob.* 
     
     
Augmented Dickey-Fuller test statistic -1.838361  0.6816 
Test critical values: 1% level  -4.013946  
 5% level  -3.436957  
 10% level  -3.142642  
 
  
Table 3: ADF TESTS FOR THE EXCHANGE RATE (FIRST DIFFERENCE) 
Null Hypothesis: D(LER) has a unit root  
Exogenous: Constant, Linear Trend  
Lag Length: 0 (Automatic based on SIC, MAXLAG=13) 
     
     
   t-Statistic   Prob.* 
     
     
Augmented Dickey-Fuller test statistic -10.89099  0.0000 
Test critical values: 1% level  -4.014288  
 5% level  -3.437122  
 10% level  -3.142739  
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ARCH tests are reported in Table 4 and stated earlier we could not reject the hypothesis that the 
series have ARCH effects. This lends support to the use of GARCH and EGARCH models. 
 
 
Table 4: ARCH TEST 
Heteroskedasticity Test: ARCH  
     
     
F-statistic 56.80550     Prob. F(1,21) 0.0000 
Obs*R-squared 16.79221     Prob. Chi-Square(1) 0.0000 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
Table 5.  GARCH ESTIMATION OF THE EXCHANGE RATE. 
 
 
   CONDITION MEAN 
 
     
 Coefficient Std. Error z-Statistic Prob.   
     
     
C 0.554223 0.094200 5.883495 0.0000 
LS(-1) 0.039685 0.004702 8.439495 0.0000 
LSALE -0.070994 0.010750 -6.603786 0.0000 
LPURCH 0.009320 0.004084 2.282072 0.0225 
     
     
 CONDITION VARIANCE   
     
     
C -0.006426 0.003082 -2.085182 0.0371 
RESID(-1)^2 1.063364 0.275898 3.854193 0.0001 
GARCH(-1) 0.346587 0.093795 3.695174 0.0002 
LSALE 0.000636 0.000294 2.166234 0.0303 
LPURCH -0.000165 8.30E-05 -1.985239 0.0471 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
  66 
 
 
 
Table 6.  EGARCH ESTIMATION OF THE EXCHANGE RATE 
 
 
   CONDITIONAL MEAN 
     
 Coefficient Std. Error z-Statistic Prob.   
     
     
C 0.280694 0.028485 9.854042 0.0000 
LS(-1) 0.012793 0.002611 4.899596 0.0000 
LSALE -0.026207 0.001299 -20.18152 0.0000 
LPURCH -0.000938 0.002635 -0.356169 0.7217 
     
     
 CONDITIONAL VARIANCE   
     
     
C(5) -7.916350 3.552413 -2.228443 0.0259 
C(6) 0.805065 0.129104 6.235775 0.0000 
C(7) 0.135139 0.094117 1.435861 0.1510 
C(8) 0.761937 0.077636 9.814174 0.0000 
C(9) 0.689722 0.375028 1.839121 0.0659 
C(10) -0.292876 0.164917 -1.775899 0.0757 
     
 
 
 
 
    Figure 7: GARCH CONDITION VARIANCE 
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Figure 8: EGARCH CONDITION VARIANCE 
 
 
 
   Figure 9: EGARCH LS RESIDUALS 
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EFFECTS OF INTERVENTION 
 
 
5.2.1 MEAN EQUATION 
We first examine the exchange rate mean level.  In the GARCH model (Table 5) lsale (log of sale) 
coefficient has a negative sign while the lpurch (purchase) coefficient has a positive sign. A 
negative coefficient indicates that the exchange rate moves in the desired direction for 
intervention, that is, a sale of $ depresses the value of the kwacha/$ exchange rate. It shows 
that sales of $ reduce the mean of the exchange rate while a positive sign on purchases indicates 
that purchasing $ increases the value of the exchange rate entailing a depreciation of the 
kwacha.  Both sales and purchases are also statistically significant. 
 
It is difficult to understand the rationale behind BOZ‟s purchases of $ from the market if in this 
case they lead to the depreciation of the kwacha. One would however, assume that the 
objective is to build international reserves rather than to influence the exchange rate. 
 
 A similar study by Domac and Mendoza (2004) which was examining the intervention operations 
of the Turkish and Mexican central banks makes the same observation that a net sale of $100 
million appreciates the exchange rate by 0.08% and 0.20% in Mexico and Turkey respectively. 
The study also observes that purchase of foreign exchange did not influence the exchange rate 
at all. 
 
In contrast to GARCH model, the EGARCH model‟s estimation results presented in Table 6 show 
that the coefficients of both sales and purchases of $ are negatively signed. The results show 
that BOZ sales and purchases activities both lead to an appreciation of the exchange rate. 
Similar results in studies such as Kim et al (2000) make the same observation that the Reserve 
Bank of Australia‟s intervention had moved the exchange rate in the desired direction of the 
intervention. Fatum and Hutchison (1999) also find evidence that intervention does affect the 
exchange rate. Our finding is also consistent with the related work of Catte et al (1999), 
Humpage (1999) and Dominguez and Frankel (1993).  
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The interpretation of the negatively signed sales coefficient also means that when the BOZ is 
selling $ it is getting kwacha from the market. This will therefore cause the exchange rate to 
appreciate (decline). This is similar to the finding of Edison et al (2003) that when on those days 
when official net sales of $ occurred in Australia, the USD/ Australian dollar tends to be rising. 
In other words, the Reserve Bank of Australia sales the domestic currency this results in its 
appreciation. 
 
 
5.2.2. VARIANCE EQUATION 
The pattern of effects of intervention on the conditional volatility is different from  
that on the conditional mean. The sales coefficient in the GARCH model is positively signed and 
it is statistically significant while the purchases coefficient is negatively signed and is 
statistically insignificant. This shows that sales of dollars increase the variance of the exchange 
rate while purchases of dollars reduce it. The 1  in this model is positively signed and is 
statistically significant. This is in line with our expectation and therefore the GARCH model is 
not the best for our study and instead the EGARCH model is best suited for this kind of study. 
 
The ARCH and GARCH coefficients are typically close to unity indicating that volatility shocks in 
the exchange rate are rather persistent. 
 
Purchases of $ reduces the variance of the exchange rate. This shows that the central bank 
actually achieves its objective of smoothing out exchange rate fluctuations. The study by 
Dominguez (1998) of the Federal Reserve intervention activities makes a similar observation that 
on general level central bank intervention increased exchange rate volatility. Similarly a study 
on the effect of sales of foreign exchange on volatility by Kim et al (2000) using Australian data 
too found that the conditional volatility of the exchange rate return was significantly raised. 
Beine et al (2002) find strong evidence that central bank interventions tend to increase, 
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rather than to reduce, the volatility of exchange rates. This result is also consistent with the 
major stream of the literature and specifically with Bonser-Neal and Tanner (1996) and Baillie 
and Osterberg (1997a, b). It is consistent with the microstructure, according to which the 
market tests the determination of the central banks just after the intervention occurs, 
especially since volatility is usually found in the literature to be positively correlated with 
turnover (see for instance Hartmann, 1998). 
 
It appears the mere presence of the central bank in the foreign exchange market sends 
ambiguous signals to market participants about both the intentions of the central bank and its 
future monetary policy. This ambiguity can be interpreted to mean that the signalling channel is 
the channel through which BOZ interventions in the foreign exchange market affects the 
exchange. 
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CHAPTER 6. CONCLUSION 
In this paper we investigate the impact of the Bank of Zambia‟s foreign exchange market 
intervention on the level and volatility of the exchange rate namely the kwacha/ USD exchange 
rate.  
To measure this impact we use GARCH (1, 1) as well as EGARCH. To determine the 
appropriateness of GARCH models we first test for ARCH effects in the data. Our ARCH presence 
is subsequently confirmed and therefore we proceed to use GARCH (1, 1). GARCH (I, I) is 
estimated using quasi maximum likelihood. 
We also use Exponential GARCH which enables us to investigate both the overall effect of the 
intervention and the individual effect of sales and purchases. 
 
We use the sign bias test to test the best model between EGARCH and GARCH. We find that the 
former model is better than the GARCH because of the asymmetrical   impact of sales and 
purchases of dollars on the exchange rate. 
 
Empirical results from the GARCH model suggest that sales of foreign exchange lead to an 
appreciation of the kwacha which is basically „leaning against the wind‟. In this regard, the 
BOZ‟s goal of reversing a depreciation of the currency is achieved. In terms of volatility, the 
GARCH results suggest that purchasing foreign exchange reduces volatility while selling it 
increases volatility. 
 
Our EGARCH results suggest that both sales and purchases of cause an appreciation of the 
exchange rate while the impacts of such interventions on volatility are mixed. Purchases of 
$ appear to reduce the volatility of the kwacha while sales of $ increase it. 
 
There are a few possible directions for future research. First it would be important to know 
exactly which channel/s the BOZ intervention activities affect the kwacha. Second it would be 
important to distinguish between secret and publicly announced interventions so that their 
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different effects on the kwacha can be compared. Thirdly, it would be interesting to extend the 
data set to include interventions on more than one exchange rate. This could include a Sub-
Saharan currency like the South African Rand which is pervasively used in the Zambian domestic 
economy. This would increase the number of observed public interventions and would allow for a 
more specific testing of hypotheses. 
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APPENDIX 1 
GARCH OUTPUT 
Dependent Variable: D(LS)   
Method: ML - ARCH (Marquardt) - Normal distribution 
Date: 05/11/09   Time: 17:49   
Sample (adjusted): 1995M03 2008M12  
Included observations: 166 after adjustments  
Convergence achieved after 40 iterations  
Presample variance: backcast (parameter = 0.7) 
GARCH = C(5) + C(6)*RESID(-1)^2 + C(7)*GARCH(-1) + C(8)*LSALE + 
        C(9)*LPURCH   
     
     
 
Coefficie
nt Std. Error z-Statistic Prob.   
     
     
C 0.554223 0.094200 5.883495 0.0000 
LS(-1) 0.039685 0.004702 8.439495 0.0000 
LSALE 
-
0.070994 0.010750 -6.603786 0.0000 
LPURCH 0.009320 0.004084 2.282072 0.0225 
     
     
 Variance Equation   
     
     
C 
-
0.006426 0.003082 -2.085182 0.0371 
RESID(-1)^2 1.063364 0.275898 3.854193 0.0001 
GARCH(-1) 0.346587 0.093795 3.695174 0.0002 
LSALE 0.000636 0.000294 2.166234 0.0303 
LPURCH 
-
0.000165 8.30E-05 -1.985239 0.0471 
     
     
R-squared 
-
0.081655     Mean dependent var 0.011131 
Adjusted R-squared 
-
0.136771     S.D. dependent var 0.047009 
S.E. of regression 0.050121     Akaike info criterion -3.569802 
Sum squared resid 0.394405     Schwarz criterion -3.401080 
Log likelihood 305.2936     Hannan-Quinn criter. -3.501317 
Durbin-Watson stat 1.579765    
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EGARCH OUPTUT 
 
 
Dependent Variable: D(LS)   
Method: ML - ARCH (Marquardt) - Normal distribution 
Date: 05/11/09   Time: 17:51   
Sample (adjusted): 1995M03 2008M12  
Included observations: 166 after adjustments  
Failure to improve Likelihood after 26 iterations 
Presample variance: backcast (parameter = 0.7) 
LOG(GARCH) = C(5) + C(6)*ABS(RESID(-1)/@SQRT(GARCH(-1))) + 
C(7) 
        *RESID(-1)/@SQRT(GARCH(-1)) + C(8)*LOG(GARCH(-1)) + C(9) 
        *LSALE + C(10)*LPURCH  
     
     
 
Coefficie
nt Std. Error z-Statistic Prob.   
     
     
C 0.280694 0.028485 9.854042 0.0000 
LS(-1) 0.012793 0.002611 4.899596 0.0000 
LSALE 
-
0.026207 0.001299 -20.18152 0.0000 
LPURCH 
-
0.000938 0.002635 -0.356169 0.7217 
     
     
 Variance Equation   
     
     
C(5) 
-
7.916350 3.552413 -2.228443 0.0259 
C(6) 0.805065 0.129104 6.235775 0.0000 
C(7) 0.135139 0.094117 1.435861 0.1510 
C(8) 0.761937 0.077636 9.814174 0.0000 
C(9) 0.689722 0.375028 1.839121 0.0659 
C(10) 
-
0.292876 0.164917 -1.775899 0.0757 
     
     
R-squared 0.004204     Mean dependent var 0.011131 
Adjusted R-squared 
-
0.053245     S.D. dependent var 0.047009 
S.E. of regression 0.048245     Akaike info criterion -3.582352 
Sum squared resid 0.363098     Schwarz criterion -3.394883 
Log likelihood 307.3352     Hannan-Quinn criter. -3.506257 
F-statistic 0.073182     Durbin-Watson stat 1.665371 
Prob(F-statistic) 0.999893    
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Dependent Variable: D(LS)   
Method: ML - ARCH (Marquardt) - Generalized error distribution 
(GED) 
Date: 05/11/09   Time: 17:52   
Sample (adjusted): 1995M03 2008M12  
Included observations: 166 after adjustments  
Failure to improve Likelihood after 5 iterations 
Presample variance: backcast (parameter = 0.7) 
LOG(GARCH) = C(5) + C(6)*ABS(RESID(-1)/@SQRT(GARCH(-1))) + 
C(7) 
        *RESID(-1)/@SQRT(GARCH(-1)) + C(8)*LOG(GARCH(-1)) + C(9) 
        *LSALE + C(10)*LPURCH  
     
     
 
Coefficie
nt Std. Error z-Statistic Prob.   
     
     
C 0.465797 0.072748 6.402926 0.0000 
LS(-1) 0.025160 0.008930 2.817417 0.0048 
LSALE 
-
0.055084 0.000818 -67.36994 0.0000 
LPURCH 0.007982 0.000625 12.78027 0.0000 
     
     
 Variance Equation   
     
     
C(5) 
-
4.264120 5.442462 -0.783491 0.4333 
C(6) 0.675041 0.254116 2.656427 0.0079 
C(7) 
-
0.036944 0.174159 -0.212126 0.8320 
C(8) 0.544335 0.149915 3.630964 0.0003 
C(9) 0.214197 0.574438 0.372880 0.7092 
C(10) 
-
0.166998 0.254078 -0.657270 0.5110 
     
     
GED PARAMETER 1.147957 0.135305 8.484190 0.0000 
     
     
R-squared 
-
0.035808     Mean dependent var 0.011131 
Adjusted R-squared 
-
0.102634     S.D. dependent var 0.047009 
S.E. of regression 0.049363     Akaike info criterion -3.749506 
Sum squared resid 0.377688     Schwarz criterion -3.543290 
Log likelihood 322.2090     Hannan-Quinn criter. -3.665802 
Durbin-Watson stat 1.624748    
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DATE 
EXCHANGE 
RATE SALE PURCH CMSALE CMPURCH 
Jan-95 688.65 36,800.00  0.00  
                    
36,800.00  
                             
-    
Feb-95 769.57 67,200.00  0.00  
                  
104,000.00  
                             
-    
Mar-95 797.08 27,100.00  7,900.00  
                  
131,100.00  
                
7,900.00  
Apr-95 802.06 30,200.00  0.00  
                  
161,300.00  
                
7,900.00  
May-95 829 35,900.00  0.00  
                  
197,200.00  
                
7,900.00  
Jun-95 893.51 47,500.00  0.00  
                  
244,700.00  
                
7,900.00  
Jul-95 927.71 29,600.00  200.00  
                  
274,300.00  
                
8,100.00  
Aug-95 930.78 31,300.00  700.00  
                  
305,600.00  
                
8,800.00  
Sep-95 932.68 36,100.00  0.00  
                  
341,700.00  
                
8,800.00  
Oct-95 932.68 28,300.00  0.00  
                  
370,000.00  
                
8,800.00  
Nov-95 927.92 41,100.00  0.00  
                  
411,100.00  
                
8,800.00  
Dec-95 937.79 62,100.00  40,700.00  
                  
473,200.00  
              
49,500.00  
Jan-96 982.19 37,000.00  0.00  
                  
510,200.00  
              
49,500.00  
Feb-96 992.2 40,000.00  0.00  
                  
550,200.00  
              
49,500.00  
Mar-96 1135.47 28,600.00  0.00  
                  
578,800.00  
              
49,500.00  
Apr-96 1282.9 31,400.00  7,100.00  
                  
610,200.00  
              
56,600.00  
May-96 1240.9 100.00  24,500.00  
                  
610,300.00  
              
81,100.00  
Jun-96 1241.03 600.00  13,010.00  
                  
610,900.00  
              
94,110.00  
Jul-96 1259.12 0.00  2,000.00  
                  
610,900.00  
              
96,110.00  
Aug-96 1267.86 0.00  9,990.00  
                  
610,900.00  
           
106,100.00  
Sep-96 1266.72 0.00  39,485.00  
                  
610,900.00  
           
145,585.00  
Oct-96 1269.15 4,200.00  9,900.00  
                  
615,100.00  
           
155,485.00  
Nov-96 1269.83 12,700.00  5,135.00  
                  
627,800.00  
           
160,620.00  
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Dec-96 1287.43 0.00  19,402.00  
                  
627,800.00  
           
180,022.00  
Jan-97 1292.1 6,410.00  0.00  
                  
634,210.00  
           
180,022.00  
Feb-97 1290.14 0.00  0.00  
                  
634,210.00  
           
180,022.00  
Mar-97 1286.48 0.00  13,090.00  
                  
634,210.00  
           
193,112.00  
Apr-97 1292.42 300.00  16,115.00  
                  
634,510.00  
           
209,227.00  
May-97 1293.72 0.00  32,450.00  
                  
634,510.00  
           
241,677.00  
Jun-97 1302.74 500.00  10,600.00  
                  
635,010.00  
           
252,277.00  
Jul-97 1312.87 0.00  12,175.00  
                  
635,010.00  
           
264,452.00  
Aug-97 1315.62 0.00  2,100.00  
                  
635,010.00  
           
266,552.00  
Sep-97 1317.52 0.00  5,800.00  
                  
635,010.00  
           
272,352.00  
Oct-97 1325.08 0.00  0.00  
                  
635,010.00  
           
272,352.00  
Nov-97 1353.14 26,900.00  0.00  
                  
661,910.00  
           
272,352.00  
Dec-97 1392.14 0.00  1,749.00  
                  
661,910.00  
           
274,101.00  
Jan-98 1454.54 23,600.00  0.00  
                  
685,510.00  
           
274,101.00  
Feb-98 1534.14 5,200.00  0.00  
                  
690,710.00  
           
274,101.00  
Mar-98 1642.93 0.00  875.00  
                  
690,710.00  
           
274,976.00  
Apr-98 1748.7 2,000.00  300.00  
                  
692,710.00  
           
275,276.00  
May-98 1830.75 0.00  0.00  
                  
692,710.00  
           
275,276.00  
Jun-98 1903.38 0.00  4,545.00  
                  
692,710.00  
           
279,821.00  
Jul-98 1929.24 0.00  5,050.00  
                  
692,710.00  
           
284,871.00  
Aug-98 1936.85 0.00  2,545.00  
                  
692,710.00  
           
287,416.00  
Sep-98 1956.39 0.00  440.00  
                  
692,710.00  
           
287,856.00  
Oct-98 2013.23 0.00  2,610.00  
                  
692,710.00  
           
290,466.00  
Nov-98 2113.23 0.00  300.00  
                  
692,710.00  
           
290,766.00  
Dec-98 2281.45 0.00  0.00  
                  
692,710.00  
           
290,766.00  
Jan-99 2379.88 0.00  0.00  
                  
692,710.00  
           
290,766.00  
Feb-99 2271.6 20,300.00  0.00  
                  
713,010.00  
           
290,766.00  
Mar-99 2212.78 0.00  0.00                               
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713,010.00  290,766.00  
Apr-99 2325.62 0.00  750.00  
                  
713,010.00  
           
291,516.00  
May-99 2389.16 0.00  0.00  
                  
713,010.00  
           
291,516.00  
Jun-99 2418.8 0.00  7,500.00  
                  
713,010.00  
           
299,016.00  
Jul-99 2431.55 5,000.00  5,400.00  
                  
718,010.00  
           
304,416.00  
Aug-99 2397.97 0.00  1,300.00  
                  
718,010.00  
           
305,716.00  
Sep-99 2381.41 0.00  4,070.00  
                  
718,010.00  
           
309,786.00  
Oct-99 2401.45 0.00  1,000.00  
                  
718,010.00  
           
310,786.00  
Nov-99 2452.42 0.00  0.00  
                  
718,010.00  
           
310,786.00  
Dec-99 2593.59 626.00  0.00  
                  
718,636.00  
           
310,786.00  
Jan-00 2653.88 0.00  0.00  
                  
718,636.00  
           
310,786.00  
Feb-00 2734.46 1,400.00  15,000.00  
                  
720,036.00  
           
325,786.00  
Mar-00 2754.84 12,400.00  14,200.00  
                  
732,436.00  
           
339,986.00  
Apr-00 2801.39 15,000.00  1,000.00  
                  
747,436.00  
           
340,986.00  
May-00 2857.76 0.00  0.00  
                  
747,436.00  
           
340,986.00  
Jun-00 2939.94 0.00  300.00  
                  
747,436.00  
           
341,286.00  
Jul-00 3083.9 0.00  0.00  
                  
747,436.00  
           
341,286.00  
Aug-00 3204.67 0.00  0.00  
                  
747,436.00  
           
341,286.00  
Sep-00 3244.11 0.00  17,000.00  
                  
747,436.00  
           
358,286.00  
Oct-00 3338.01 0.00  0.00  
                  
747,436.00  
           
358,286.00  
Nov-00 3608.42 0.00  0.00  
                  
747,436.00  
           
358,286.00  
Dec-00 4108.75 0.00  1,500.00  
                  
747,436.00  
           
359,786.00  
Jan-01 4024.53 7,600.00  7,000.00  
                  
755,036.00  
           
366,786.00  
Feb-01 3602.66 32,600.00  0.00  
                  
787,636.00  
           
366,786.00  
Mar-01 3349.59 26,550.00  4,790.00  
                  
814,186.00  
           
371,576.00  
Apr-01 3104.48 36,700.00  300.00  
                  
850,886.00  
           
371,876.00  
May-01 3323.04 32,850.00  2,090.00  
                  
883,736.00  
           
373,966.00  
Jun-01 3604.46 14,050.00  0.00  
                  
897,786.00  
           
373,966.00  
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Jul-01 3685.3 36,850.00  6,800.00  
                  
934,636.00  
           
380,766.00  
Aug-01 3594.3 36,150.00  3,600.00  
                  
970,786.00  
           
384,366.00  
Sep-01 3678.19 22,400.00  0.00  
                  
993,186.00  
           
384,366.00  
Oct-01 3743.49 37,150.00  0.00  
              
1,030,336.00  
           
384,366.00  
Nov-01 3800.85 37,050.00  0.00  
              
1,067,386.00  
           
384,366.00  
Dec-01 3820.33 20,800.00  0.00  
              
1,088,186.00  
           
384,366.00  
Jan-02 3848.65 22,300.00  3,600.00  
              
1,110,486.00  
           
387,966.00  
Feb-02 3904.25 16,500.00  0.00  
              
1,126,986.00  
           
387,966.00  
Mar-02 3930.72 20,830.00  0.00  
              
1,147,816.00  
           
387,966.00  
Apr-02 3939.03 12,300.00  0.00  
              
1,160,116.00  
           
387,966.00  
May-02 4097.61 28,000.00  0.00  
              
1,188,116.00  
           
387,966.00  
Jun-02 4354.66 21,900.00  200.00  
              
1,210,016.00  
           
388,166.00  
Jul-02 4499.23 23,900.00  350.00  
              
1,233,916.00  
           
388,516.00  
Aug-02 4492.73 30,500.00  3,500.00  
              
1,264,416.00  
           
392,016.00  
Sep-02 5619.21 16,100.00  7,300.00  
              
1,280,516.00  
           
399,316.00  
Oct-02 4603.27 34,400.00  1,100.00  
              
1,314,916.00  
           
400,416.00  
Nov-02 4753.73 27,199.00  0.00  
              
1,342,115.00  
           
400,416.00  
Dec-02 4740.05 32,700.00  0.00  
              
1,374,815.00  
           
400,416.00  
Jan-03 4410.96 25,600.00  0.00  
              
1,400,415.00  
           
400,416.00  
Feb-03 4668.71 23,200.00  300.00  
              
1,423,615.00  
           
400,716.00  
Mar-03 4877.52 11,990.00  1,000.00  
              
1,435,605.00  
           
401,716.00  
Apr-03 4866.4 18,650.00  8,100.00  
              
1,454,255.00  
           
409,816.00  
May-03 4824.04 14,800.00  6,700.00  
              
1,469,055.00  
           
416,516.00  
Jun-03 4847.04 17,000.00  3,500.00  
              
1,486,055.00  
           
420,016.00  
Jul-03 4779.32 12,700.00  6,500.00  
              
1,498,755.00  
           
426,516.00  
Aug-03 4698.57 0.00  4,410.00  
              
1,498,755.00  
           
430,926.00  
Sep-03 4745.65 0.00  0.00  
              
1,498,755.00  
           
430,926.00  
Oct-03 4752.02 0.00  2,000.00                           
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1,498,755.00  432,926.00  
Nov-03 4751.27 0.00  0.00  
              
1,498,755.00  
           
432,926.00  
Dec-03 4577.75 0.00  1,000.00  
              
1,498,755.00  
           
433,926.00  
Jan-04 4767.64 0.00  0.00  
              
1,498,755.00  
           
433,926.00  
Feb-04 4762.51 0.00  3,000.00  
              
1,498,755.00  
           
436,926.00  
Mar-04 4722.06 0.00  11,500.00  
              
1,498,755.00  
           
448,426.00  
Apr-04 4734.95 0.00  9,800.00  
              
1,498,755.00  
           
458,226.00  
May-04 4754.58 0.00  12,198.50  
              
1,498,755.00  
           
470,424.50  
Jun-04 4832.62 0.00  11,551.90  
              
1,498,755.00  
           
481,976.40  
Jul-04 4783.13 0.00  9,500.00  
              
1,498,755.00  
           
491,476.40  
Aug-04 4787.26 0.00  7,200.00  
              
1,498,755.00  
           
498,676.40  
Sep-04 4856.29 0.00  25,000.00  
              
1,498,755.00  
           
523,676.40  
Oct-04 4896.31 3,500.00  0.00  
              
1,502,255.00  
           
523,676.40  
Nov-04 4797.64 4,000.00  0.00  
              
1,506,255.00  
           
523,676.40  
Dec-04 4651.51 0.00  1,000.00  
              
1,506,255.00  
           
524,676.40  
Jan-05 4,785.12 0.00  14,000.00  
              
1,506,255.00  
           
538,676.40  
Feb-05 4,758.50 0.00  2,000.00  
              
1,506,255.00  
           
540,676.40  
Mar-05 4,710.58 0.00  16,900.00  
              
1,506,255.00  
           
557,576.40  
Apr-05 4,675.15 0.00  23,000.00  
              
1,506,255.00  
           
580,576.40  
May-05 4,691.79 0.00  12,000.00  
              
1,506,255.00  
           
592,576.40  
Jun-05 4,685.77 0.00  17,700.00  
              
1,506,255.00  
           
610,276.40  
Jul-05 4,624.46 200.00  31,000.00  
              
1,506,455.00  
           
641,276.40  
Aug-05 4,401.88 0.00  5,500.00  
              
1,506,455.00  
           
646,776.40  
Sep-05 4,439.67 0.00  0.00  
              
1,506,455.00  
           
646,776.40  
Oct-05 4,346.08 0.00  0.00  
              
1,506,455.00  
           
646,776.40  
Nov-05 4,026.68 0.00  0.00  
              
1,506,455.00  
           
646,776.40  
Dec-05 3,416.34 3,000.00  5,000.00  
              
1,509,455.00  
           
651,776.40  
Jan-06 3,363.72 0.00  12,000.00  
              
1,509,455.00  
           
663,776.40  
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Feb-06 3,289.61 0.00  0.00  
              
1,509,455.00  
           
663,776.40  
Mar-06 3,294.74 0.00  0.00  
              
1,509,455.00  
           
663,776.40  
Apr-06 3,201.50 0.00  42,500.00  
              
1,509,455.00  
           
706,276.40  
May-06 3,184.97 7,000.00  15,500.00  
              
1,516,455.00  
           
721,776.40  
Jun-06 3,470.61 0.00  8,500.00  
              
1,516,455.00  
           
730,276.40  
Jul-06 3,546.72 5,000.00  0.00  
              
1,521,455.00  
           
730,276.40  
Aug-06 3,883.95 28,000.00  12,500.00  
              
1,549,455.00  
           
742,776.40  
Sep-06 4,046.46 16,000.00  90,800.00  
              
1,565,455.00  
           
833,576.40  
Oct-06 3,835.17 14,500.00  39,000.00  
              
1,579,955.00  
           
872,576.40  
Nov-06 3,984.97 7,000.00  0.00  
              
1,586,955.00  
           
872,576.40  
Dec-06 4,127.83 36,200.00  0.00  
              
1,623,155.00  
           
872,576.40  
Jan-07 4,221.06 21,500.00  0.00  
              
1,644,655.00  
           
872,576.40  
Feb-07 4,254.02 4,500.00  0.00  
              
1,649,155.00  
           
872,576.40  
Mar-07 4,258.53 8,000.00  42,500.00  
              
1,657,155.00  
           
915,076.40  
Apr-07 4,161.47 9,000.00  22,500.00  
              
1,666,155.00  
           
937,576.40  
May-07 4,013.82 0.00  34,408.00  
              
1,666,155.00  
           
971,984.40  
Jun-07 3,888.11 0.00  10,000.00  
              
1,666,155.00  
           
981,984.40  
Jul-07 3,823.05 5,000.00  6,000.00  
              
1,671,155.00  
           
987,984.40  
Aug-07 4,013.08 25,500.00  0.00  
              
1,696,655.00  
           
987,984.40  
Sep-07 3,960.70 3,000.00  12,500.00  
              
1,699,655.00  
        
1,000,484.40  
Oct-07 3,831.36 0.00  3,000.00  
              
1,699,655.00  
        
1,003,484.40  
Nov-07 3,766.67 6,000.00  11,000.00  
              
1,705,655.00  
        
1,014,484.40  
Dec-07 3,836.88 9,500.00  0.00  
              
1,715,155.00  
        
1,014,484.40  
Jan-08 3,792.78 11,000.00  0.00  
              
1,726,155.00  
        
1,014,484.40  
Feb-08 3,753.59 0.00  0.00  
              
1,726,155.00  
        
1,014,484.40  
Mar-08 3,668.91 2,000.00  13,000.00  
              
1,728,155.00  
        
1,027,484.40  
Apr-08 3,519.41 0.00  17,500.00  
              
1,728,155.00  
        
1,044,984.40  
May-08 3,399.20 15,500.00  7,000.00                        
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1,743,655.00  1,051,984.40  
Jun-08 3,249.70 8,000.00  15,500.00  
              
1,751,655.00  
        
1,067,484.40  
Jul-08 3,393.37 32,500.00  0.00  
              
1,784,155.00  
        
1,067,484.40  
Aug-08 3,452.79 5,000.00  0.00  
              
1,789,155.00  
        
1,067,484.40  
Sep-08 3,539.85 22,500.00  3,500.00  
              
1,811,655.00  
        
1,070,984.40  
Oct-08 4,044.33 48,000.00  0.00  
              
1,859,655.00  
        
1,070,984.40  
Nov-08 4,256.98 15,000.00  3,500.00  
              
1,874,655.00  
        
1,074,484.40  
Dec-08 4,882.97 70,000.00  2,000.00  
              
1,944,655.00  
        
1,076,484.40  
 
APPENDIX  3. 
DATE  K/$   DATE  k/$ 
Jan-98 1454.54   Aug-03 4698.57 
Feb-98 1534.14   Sep-03 4745.65 
Mar-98 1642.93   Oct-03 4752.02 
Apr-98 1748.7   Nov-03 4751.27 
May-98 1830.75   Dec-03 4577.75 
Jun-98 1903.38   Jan-04 4767.64 
Jul-98 1929.24   Feb-04 4762.51 
Aug-98 1936.85   Mar-04 4722.06 
Sep-98 1956.39   Apr-04 4734.95 
Oct-98 2013.23   May-04 4754.58 
Nov-98 2113.23   Jun-04 4832.62 
Dec-98 2281.45   Jul-04 4783.13 
Jan-99 2379.88   Aug-04 4787.26 
Feb-99 2271.6   Sep-04 4856.29 
Mar-99 2212.78   Oct-04 4896.31 
Apr-99 2325.62   Nov-04 4797.64 
May-99 2389.16   Dec-04 4651.51 
Jun-99 2418.8   Jan-05 4,785.12 
Jul-99 2431.55   Feb-05 4,758.50 
Aug-99 2397.97   Mar-05 4,710.58 
Sep-99 2381.41   Apr-05 4,675.15 
Oct-99 2401.45   May-05 4,691.79 
Nov-99 2452.42   Jun-05 4,685.77 
Dec-99 2593.59   Jul-05 4,624.46 
Jan-00 2653.88   Aug-05 4,401.88 
Feb-00 2734.46   Sep-05 4,439.67 
Mar-00 2754.84   Oct-05 4,346.08 
Apr-00 2801.39   Nov-05 4,026.68 
May-00 2857.76   Dec-05 3,416.34 
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Jun-00 2939.94   Jan-06 3,363.72 
Jul-00 3083.9   Feb-06 3,289.61 
Aug-00 3204.67   Mar-06 3,294.74 
Sep-00 3244.11   Apr-06 3,201.50 
Oct-00 3338.01   May-06 3,184.97 
Nov-00 3608.42   Jun-06 3,470.61 
Dec-00 4108.75   Jul-06 3,546.72 
Jan-01 4024.53   Aug-06 3,883.95 
Feb-01 3602.66   Sep-06 4,046.46 
Mar-01 3349.59   Oct-06 3,835.17 
Apr-01 3104.48   Nov-06 3,984.97 
May-01 3323.04   Dec-06 4,127.83 
Jun-01 3604.46   Jan-07 4,221.06 
Jul-01 3685.3   Feb-07 4,254.02 
Aug-01 3594.3   Mar-07 4,258.53 
Sep-01 3678.19   Apr-07 4,161.47 
Oct-01 3743.49   May-07 4,013.82 
Nov-01 3800.85   Jun-07 3,888.11 
Dec-01 3820.33   Jul-07 3,823.05 
Jan-02 3848.65   Aug-07 4,013.08 
Feb-02 3904.25   Sep-07 3,960.70 
Mar-02 3930.72   Oct-07 3,831.36 
Apr-02 3939.03   Nov-07 3,766.67 
May-02 4097.61   Dec-07 3,836.88 
Jun-02 4354.66   Jan-08 3,792.78 
Jul-02 4499.23   Feb-08 3,753.59 
Aug-02 4492.73   Mar-08 3,668.91 
Sep-02 5619.21   Apr-08 3,519.41 
Oct-02 4603.27   May-08 3,399.20 
Nov-02 4753.73   Jun-08 3,249.70 
Dec-02 4740.05   Jul-08 3,393.37 
Jan-03 4410.96   Aug-08 3,452.79 
Feb-03 4668.71   Sep-08 3,539.85 
Mar-03 4877.52   Oct-08 4,044.33 
Apr-03 4866.4   Nov-08 4,256.98 
May-03 4824.04   Dec-08 4,882.97 
Jun-03 4847.04     
Jul-03 4779.32     
      
 
